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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

12/26/04 <link>
Church-State Separation in the United States:
Religion in Public Schools and the Legal/Off-Courtroom Strategies of the Christian Right

Detailed coverage is here.

6/29/04 <link>
U.S. Supreme Court rulings - interesting statistics
Tom Goldstein has the numbers:

Statistical Analysis

Here is our take on some of the numbers for this term versus previous terms.

1. The Justices decided 74 cases after argument this Term. The numbers of decisions after argument for previous Terms are 80 (OT02), 76 (OT01), 79 (OT00), 74 (OT99), 78 (OT98), 92 (OT97), 81 (OT96), 77 (OT95), 84 (OT94), 84 (OT93), 107 (OT92), 107 (OT91), 102 (OT90).

2. This Term returned to its previous level of 5-4 decisions, 21 of 79 (27%), up from 13 of 80 (16%) in OT02. The numbers for previous Terms are 21 of 76–28% (OT01), 26 0f 79–33% (OT00), 21 of 74–28% (OT99), 19 of 80–24% (OT98), 16 of 96–17% (OT97), 17 of 91–19% (OT96), 16 of 85–19% (OT95).

The number of unanimous opinions also dropped, to 25 of 79 (32%), from 31 of 80–39% (OT02). The numbers from previous years are 26 of 81–32% (OT01), 25 of 85–29% (OT00).

3. In this Term’s 5-4 decisions, Justice O’Connor was in the majority in 16 of 21, but authored none of the majority opinions. Justice Kennedy was in the majority 15 times, followed by Justices Thomas (14) and Scalia (11).

The Court’s conservative majority (WHR, SOC, AS, AMK, CT) held together in nearly half (10 of 21) of the 5-4 cases this Term. This figure is comparable to last year (6 of 13–46%) and the year before (10 of 21–48%) The numbers for previous Terms are 14 of 26–54% (OT00), 14 of 21–66% (OT99), 10 of 19–53% (OT98), 6 of 16–38% (OT97), 8 of 17–47% (OT96), 7 of 16–44% (OT95).

Four other 5-4 cases were decided by a majority composed of the remaining four Justices (JPS, DS, RBG, and SGB) plus Justice O’Connor. Unlike last term, in which no other Justice “defected” from the conservative majority to join the remaining four Justices in a 5-4 majority, this year both Justices Kennedy (in 2 cases) and Thomas (in 1 case) defected. In OT01, Justice O’Connor defected four times and Justices Rehnquist and Thomas defected once each. In OT00, seven 5-4 cases were decided by these four Justices and a defector, with Justice O’Connor providing the fifth vote four times and Justice Kennedy three.

4. Although Justices Souter and Ginsburg continued to show a high degree of affinity, Justices Scalia and Thomas–who historically have been the justices with the greatest degree of affinity–this year disagreed more often than in the last 8 years. Justices Scalia and Thomas also agreed less often than did six other pairs of justices: Souter-Ginsburg (85% in whole/92% in part/94% in the judgment), Rehnquist-O’Connor (79/90/91), Ginsburg-Breyer (77/91/94), Stevens-Souter (77/90/91), Stevens-Ginsburg (75/90/92), and Rehnquist-Kennedy (77/86/91).

Justices Souter and Ginsburg: Their percentages of agreement were: 85% (in full), 92% (in full or in part), 94% (in full, in part, or in the judgment). Their numbers for previous Terms are 88/91/91 (OT02), 86/90/94 (OT01), 79/94/94 (OT00), 81/88/91 (OT99), 82/91/91 (OT98), 82/87/88 (OT97), 75/87/91 (OT96), 78/unavail./90 (OT95).

Justices Scalia and Thomas: Their percentages of agreement this Term were: 73% (in full), 79% (in full or part), 91% (in full, in part, or in the judgment). The two Justices disagreed completely 9% of the time, up from only 5% last Term. Their percentages in previous Terms were 89/92/95 (OT02), 82/87/92 (OT01), 76/92/99 (OT00), 81/91/93 (OT99), 76/92/95 (OT98), 82/88/93 (OT97), 88/98/99 (OT96), 83/unavail./93 (OT95).

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy agreed less frequently this Term than last Term: 77% (in full), 86% (in full or part), 91% (in full, in part, or in the judgment). In OT02 the numbers were 86/91/93.

The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor remained stable: 79% (in full), 90% (in full or part), 91% (in full, in part, or in the judgment), similar to 82/87/87 from last Term. Their numbers for previous Terms were 71/75/79 (OT01), 73/86/86 (OT00), 87/94/95 (OT99), 79/86/87 (OT98), 80/86/88 (OT97), 73/82/84 (OT96), 78/unavail./87 (OT95).

Measured by agreement in full or in part, the pairing with the lowest affinity this Term was Justices Stevens and Scalia. Their percentages of agreement were: 38% (in full), 51% (in full or part), 60% (in full, in part, or in the judgment). This is a drop from their affinity last year, 53/57/66 (OT02), and a return to their affinity from previous years: 36/46/53 (OT01), 36/52/60 (OT00). Excluding the 25 unanimous cases from this Term, Justices Stevens and Scalia agreed in full only 5 times, and disagreed completely 31 times (40%).

The pairing last year with the lowest affinity was Justices Thomas and Breyer, with 50/53/66 (OT02). Their affinity declined slightly this year at 45% (in full), 53% in full or part, 64% (in full, in part, or in the judgment).

5. As usual, Justice O’Connor was in the dissent the least often. She dissented in just 5 of the Court’s 79 cases, significantly fewer than the next-least-dissenting justice, Justice Kennedy, with 10 dissenting votes. Last Term, Justice O’Connor dissented 5 times, as compared with 10 (OT01), 8 (OT00), 4 (OT99), 7 (OT98), 11 (OT97), 10 (OT96), 8 (OT95).

6/28/04 <link>
Supreme Court rules on "enemy combatant" and detainee cases
It is no exaggeration to state that the entire core of the U.S. as a country, and what it stands for, was at stake in these rulings. As these excerpts from other blogs show, there is some good news finally. This gives us some hope that the U.S. may gradually return to being the country that was admired not too long ago - for what it stood for.

Via Atrios, we have SCOTUS blog:

No presidential monopoly on war powers

The Supreme Court's first review of the Bush administration's handling of the war on terrorism may force a fundamental reordering of constitutional priorities, especially in the way the government may deal with individuals caught up in that war. Amid all the writing by the Justices in today's three historic rulings, no sentence stands out as vividly as this one, "A state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."

Given the almost limitless claims to presidential power that the administration has been making in court cases and other forums since soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks, that statement - and all that it stands for in the new rulings - must be taken as a severe rebuke.

In countless courtroom briefs, and in a pile of secret internal memorandum only recently beginning to emerge, administration lawyers have sought to justify a new order in which the president may do whatever is deemed necessary to wage this new style of global conflict. That argument appears to have failed utterly, in the eyes of eight Justices of the Court.

Here, in summary, is a first look at a new constitutional order that may arise from the new decisions:

1. In general, the courts are open and functioning, and they will insist upon a full partnership in judging the constitutional necessity of wartime actions that affect individuals - citizens and, sometimes, foreign nationals, too.

2. Congress would be constitutionally entitled to exercise a fuller role, if it were so inclined, as a co-manager of the war when that conflict impacts individual rights.

3. Citizens - even those deemed to be terrorist suspects - can no longer be detained indefinitely and without any rights that the Pentagon does not want them to have.

4. Even foreign nationals rounded up and placed at an offshore Navy base - in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba - are constitutionally entitled to contest their detention, perhaps even when that might interfere with military interrogation of them, seeking to gain intelligence information.

In historic terms, the new rulings are at least as serious a setback as the Executive branch suffered in 1952 when the Court, in the midst of the Korean War, struck down President Truman's seizure of U.S. steel mills to keep them open to produce war materiel. (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer)

"History and common sense," the Court said today, "teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means of oppression and abuse of others who do not present. . .an immediate threat."

In language unmistakably placing the Court in the forefront of the constitutional battles that will continue to be waged so long as the war on terrorism continues, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's lead opinion declared: "Striking the constitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship." There can no longer remain any doubt that "striking the constitutional balance" will be done by the courts, not by the Executive or by Congress. No can there linger any doubt that when the opinions speaks of "our calculus," it meant judicial calculus. It is noteworthy that this view of judicial authority was shared today by all but one of the Justices (all but Clarence Thomas); seldom does this often-divided Court hold together so cohesively on the division of governmental powers.

The President, of course, did not lose everything he had at stake. By a vote of 5-4, the Court ruled that Congress' post-9/ll declaration supporting the President's response to those attacks had authorized the Executive to capture and detain, perhaps even until the end of the war on terrorism, those suspected of being terrorist activists acting in open aggression toward the U.S. Even so, the Court did not necessarily embrace that as an enduring constitutional concept: it added that the idea of detention for the duration of a conflict had emerged from the era of traditional wars, and then commented: "If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel." In other words, a war on terrorism that has no end may turn out to be too long for the Justices to go on allowing indefinite detention.

The most important qualification on that now-acknowledged power to detain, however, is the Court's mandate that when a detainee is a U.S. citizen, the detention can continue beyond an initial - and presumably fairly brief - period, only if the government can justify prolonging the denial of freedom and legal rights. And, such justification is to be judged by a "neutral decisionmaker," not by the President or the Secretary of Defense or a military authority.

Acknowledging that this review process may not necessarily have to be in a regular civilian federal court, the Justices suggested that such a proceeding might possibly be allowed before a military tribunal. The Court stressed, nevertheless, that such a tribunal would have to be "appropriately authorized and properly constituted." That seems to imply that it would not be enough simply to have the President sign an Executive Order, and that Congress may have to do so by legislation. Moreover, any such tribunal must have the full attributes of independence and neutrality that the Justices indicate they are demanding. (Even if such tribunals are created, their makeup, of course, will be subject to future constitutional challenge, if those that emerge seem to fall short of the standards articulated by the Court.

In one aspect of the new decisions, the President seems actually to have lost everything: that was the insistence that the American courts have no role whatsoever to play in overseeing the operation of the big detention facility set up at the Navy base in Guantanamo, Cuba. That base was set up in that very place to place foreign nationals at a site beyond the reach of American courts. It was, its challengers have always said, meant to be a "lawless" place. From now on, though, the detainees there have at least some right to contest not only the fact of their detention at the base prison, but also to challenge the actual conditions under which they have to live day by day.

With that ruling, the Executive branch effectively had to forfeit a substantial amount of its control over the entire Guantanamo operation.

These were the specifics of the three rulings today:

By a vote of 5-4, the Court found the 2001 congressional declaration did give the President power to detain citizens and foreign nationals, if they are found on a foreign battlefield.

By a vote of 8-1, citizens detained as "enemy combatants" have the right to a fair process under which they can challenge that designation and their continued detention.

By a vote of 6-3, the Court ruled that the foreign nationals detained at the Cuba base have a right to file lawsuits in civilian courts to contest their detention and conditions at the base.

More from SCOTUS blog here:

Hamdi and Padilla Appear to be a Huge Loss for the Government

This is based upon a very cursory first read, but it appears to me that Hamdi and Padilla in conjunction are a huge loss for the Government. (Lyle Denniston will be providing further analysis shortly.) The Government, recall, acknowledged that detention of these persons was necessary and proper principally for purposes of interrogating them for intelligence reasons. (Hence the denial of counsel, etc.; see the Jacoby Declaration in Padilla.)

In Padilla, it appears that only four Justices reach (or even discuss) the question of the lawfulness of the detention. Justice Stevens writes that "the Non-Detention Act, 18 U. S. C. 4001(a), prohibits -- and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, 115 Stat. 224, adopted on September 18, 2001, does not authorize -- the protracted, incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the United States." He continues:

"At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even more important than the method of selecting the people's rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law. Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber. Access to counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due process. Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information. Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure. Whether the information so procured is more or less reliable than that acquired by more extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny."

In Hamdi, four Justices, including Justice Scalia, conclude that Hamdi's detention itself is unlawful -- a result that Hamdi himself barely argued for (his briefs being more focused on the opportunity to challenge his enemy-combatant status). Four other Justices -- Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer -- conclude that Congress's 9/18/01 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizes detention of a "narrow" category of citizens: those who are "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and who "engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there." They read the AUMF to authorize detention of such citizens "for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured" (because, says the plurality, such detention "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use").

The plurality goes on to emphasize, however, that the detention must be "to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield," which the plurality views as "a fundamental incident of waging war." This means that Hamdi can be held, the plurality concludes, not until the end of the "war on terror," which the plurality acknowledges may not come in Hamdi's lifetime, but instead only until the end of the "active combat operations in Afghanistan." And here's the key sentence: "Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized."

This should mean that Padilla's detention -- which the Government acknowledges is principally for the purpose of interrogation -- likewise is not authorized. Even if Justice O'Connor's opinion might not conclusively dictate that result, there appear to be (at least) five votes for it: the four dissenters in Hamdi (Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia and Stevens), as well as Justice Breyer, who joins the Stevens dissent in Padilla.

Some summary comments from Prof. Balkin, via Michael Froomkin (Discourse.net):

Now that I've had a chance to read the Hamdi, Padilla, and Rasul cases, a few thoughts:

(1) Institutionally speaking, the Court is reasserting its authority in the face of an Administration that repeatedly said it was irrelevant. Generally speaking, this is not a good thing to tell courts. If you tell courts they have no jurisdiction to oversee Executive misbehavior, they will strain to find that they have the formal ability to do so, even if they don't exercise it in practice.

(2) The plurality opinion in Hamdi is clearly a pragmatic compromise. Justice O'Connor strains to find Congressional authorization for detaining enemy combatants (Justice Souter's concurrence explains why the argument is strained), so that she can then hold that some process is due-- essentially the right to be heard and present your own evidence to prove your own innocence and the right to rebut assertions from the state. Hamdi also has a right to an attorney on remand, but the plurality stops short of saying that enemy combatants always have a right to an attorney. In dicta, O'Connor states that the Executive may provide due process through military tribunals immediately after a person is captured, or, in a subsequent habeas proceedings in which the burden is on the accused to show that he or she is not an enemy combatant. This is unnecessary to the decision of the case but it's clearly advice to lower courts. The advice is worrisome precisely because it's unnecessary.

(3) The plurality dodges the question of whether the Executive can hold detainees forever. It insists that as prisoners of war detainees must be released when hostilities cease, and says that as of yet, the war in Afghanistan has not ended. What about the war against Al Qaeda? The Court has nothing to say on this point.

(4) Everyone on the Court categorically rejects the idea that the Congressional authorization for the use of force following 9/11 suspended the writ of habeas corpus.

(5) Props to my man Nino, who I regularly make fun of in these pages. Scalia, joined by Stevens, takes a hard line against the Administration. Either you treat U.S. citizens as criminal suspects, and charge them with the various federal crimes against aiding the enemy, or else you ask Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and create special procedures. Scalia likes bright line rules, and so he draws them. His opinion does not apply to aliens, although if a resident alien is accused of aiding the enemy, Scalia does not fully explain why the Bill of Rights shouldn't apply. Scalia makes fun of the plurality's use of the balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge-- a pension benefits case-- to devise its minimum rules of Due Process. His point is that the Supreme Court is doing what Congress should have done: had the guts to suspend the writ and impose its own rules. If Congress isn't willing to do that, the Court shouldn't step in and play "Mr. Fix-It" in Scalia's words. Although I don't agree with Scalia's either-or vision of how to deal with this problem, I have to say that he comes out strongly for protecting the rights of American citizens against Executive overreaching, something that he has been less eager to protect in other contexts.

(6) Clarence Thomas shows, once again, that he has no conception of what constitutional freedom means. Thomas swallows the Administration's strongest claims hook line and sinker. If the Executive determines that an American citizen is an enemy combatant, that is all the process that is due. Courts have nothing to say. This is an outrageous position for a Justice who purports to defend the American Constitution. Thomas's opinion shows how easily the theory of the "Unitary Executive" so much beloved by legal conservatives can be turned into a justification for authoritarianism. Because the Executive needs to be energetic, act in secrecy, and with dispatch, power to make decisions about war and foreign affairs must rest in a single hand. Because it must rest in a single hand, there can be no oversight by the judiciary. "Judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a unitary Executive." That means that the Executive can simply round up whoever it likes, declare them an enemy combatant, and hold them indefinitely. Guaranteeing rights to be heard, present evidence, and consult with counsel will interfere with the ability of the Executive to interrogate abuse and torture detainees. Although Thomas is often praised for being independent-minded, when it comes to assertions of executive power-- and particularly executive power to mistreat prisoners-- he is the most syncophantic of the Justices. He has never seen an arbitrary executive action he didn't like. There is an authoritarian strain in his opinions that is truly frightening.

(7) The Padilla case turned on the question whether Padilla should bring suit in New York or in South Carolina. Now that he must bring suit in South Carolina, his constitutional claims will be subjected to the tender mercies of the Fourth Circuit. This leaves Hamdi as the major case in this area. And Hamdi is written to avoid addressing some of the most difficult issues. It was always clear that Padilla, who was arrested at O'Hare airport, presented a tougher case for the Administration than Hamdi.

(8) Rasul (the Guantanamo Case) expands habeas jurisdiction overseas on technical grounds. It does not reach any of the important constitutional issues.

(9) In essence, the Court has said in these cases: don't tell us that we are irrelevant. The flip side of that demand is that if the Administration now goes through the motions of justifying its decisions before a court, courts are much more likely to let it do what it likes. In that sense, the decisions in Hamdi and Rasul cannot be understood to be complete victories for civil liberties. But they are better than the alternatives.

6/30/03 <link>
Supreme Court makes remarkable death penalty ruling
David Stout's report in the New York Times made us thrilled that this Supreme Court continues to surprise us. Here are some snippets:
"...The Supreme Court spared the life of a convicted killer in Maryland today, declaring that his inexperienced lawyers had let him down at his trial 14 years ago.
In a 7-to-2 vote in which they reiterated the need for an adequate defense in death-penalty cases, the justices threw out the sentence imposed on Kevin Wiggins, a borderline retarded man with no prior record who was convicted of drowning an elderly Baltimore County woman in 1988 in the apartment complex where he worked as a painter and handyman. 
At his trial in 1989, Mr. Wiggins's lawyers elected to have the defendant tried by a judge without a jury, and the judge found him guilty. Then a jury deliberated on what sentence to impose.
The defendant's inexperienced lawyers failed to adequately convey to the jury the horrendous abuse he endured throughout his childhood — from his alcoholic mother, who burned his hands on the stove as punishment and turned him into the street to beg for food, and in various foster-home settings, where he was subjected to sexual assaults and beatings — the high court found today.
"The mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and present in this case is powerful," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote. "Given both the nature and extent of the abuse petitioner suffered, we find there to be a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, would have introduced it at sentencing in an admissible form."
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer agreed. The ruling leaves the conviction intact but grants a new sentencing hearing
..." 
As usual it was only the bloodthirsty two (President Bush's favorite Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas of Anita Hill fame who voted against this, not surprisingly).

We have stated our opinion before that the death penalty should be reserved only for those cases where the guilt of the convicted person is known without *any* doubt. What we did not emphasize then, and we do here, is that we believe it is very critical to ensure due process and proper legal representation for those who face the death penalty. Given the recent report by Alan Berlow in The Atlantic Monthly that Mr. Death, er., President Bush's White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez rigged death penalty cases to prevent even potentially innocent people from getting a fair shake in Texas (while the then Governor Bush played along as he also lied conveniently about how confident he was about the guilt of the accused), and given Mr. Ashcroft's love for the death penalty, it is high time we had some reasonable people in the United States who would like to pay some attention to due process.  

2/8/03 <link>
Conviction of medical marijuana supporter/grower on Federal Drug charges enrages jury
We quote from the Salon article, as it says it all (bold text is our emphasis). 
"...A few hours later, Craig and her follow jurors voted to convict Rosenthal on three federal drug charges. And about five minutes after that, Craig discovered that she had made a horrible mistake: She hadn't been given all the facts about Rosenthal, and she didn't have to convict him. Rosenthal, it turns out, wasn't the garden-variety marijuana grower that federal prosecutors had made him out to be. In 1996, California voters adopted Proposition 215, which allows seriously ill individuals in need of pain relief to possess and use marijuana with the approval of a medical doctor. Shortly after the passage of Proposition 215, several groups formed "medical cannabis dispensaries" to serve as a source of marijuana for those qualified to receive it. Rosenthal grew his marijuana for one of these dispensaries; in fact, the City of Oakland deputized Rosenthal as an official supplier for one of them. None of this mattered to the Justice Department prosecutors who indicted Rosenthal. Although candidate George W. Bush proclaimed that states should be free to make their own decisions about the legality of medical marijuana, his Justice Department since the election has taken exactly the opposite approach, aggressively pursuing civil and criminal actions against individuals and groups associated with the medical marijuana movement. Californians and voters in seven other states have legalized medical marijuana, but Washington apparently knows better. "There is no such thing as medical marijuana," a spokesperson for the DEA told the Associated Press last week..."

So much for Mr. Ashcroft's support for "states' rights". Add this to the previous positions - on assisted suicide, gun control

12/9/02 <link> (UPDATED 2/8/03)
Bush-appointed Federal Judge nixes GAO lawsuit against Vice President Dick Cheney
It is unfortunate that Judge Bates chose to display no vision whatsoever on this crucial case, because it will affect the future of Government in this country, whether the President is a Democrat or a Republican! But one must ask whether this has anything to do with the fact that he worked as Deputy Independent Counsel to Ken Starr
Dana Milbank reports in the Washington Post that the GAO decided to not appeal due to lack of support from a GOP-congress and lack of funds.

12/6/02 <link>
Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals holds that California's ban on assault weapons in constitutional
Court's opinion is also that gun ownership is not a fundamental right under the Constitution.

11/8/02 <link>
California's far-reaching abortion-rights bill
We just became aware of the passage of this Bill in CA a month and a half ago. At a time when many states are putting abortion-rights supporters on the defensive, California lives up to its liberal name through far-reaching abortion-rights legislation, the first of its kind in the nation. In this sense, California continues to show its progressive nature that balances the regression of others in the U.S. 

As much as one may disagree on the morality of abortion (we support the Supreme Court decision on Roe vs. Wade), it is incumbent on human beings who protest abortions to also realize, among other things, that:
(a) population growth in the world is astronomical - it will not keep up with needed resources which are very scarce even today
(b) accidental pregnancies (due to birth control failures) are impossible to prevent with 100% guarantees today, in a safe and healthy manner,
(c) women who become pregnant due to rape or incest also have the moral right to abort the fetus 

It is hard to understand the views of those who are willing to provide more support, attention and money to saving the lives of fetuses than to the:
- the tens of millions of children who are in abject poverty and with limited to no healthcare around the globe, and
- the hundreds of millions of women in poverty and with limited to no health care around the globe, who also lack adequate birth control to keep population from continuing to grow unchecked.

We refer you to the U.N. Population Fund's report on global population. For instance, their report points out, "...Population Growing Fastest Where Needs Are Greatest....World population will grow by 50 per cent, from 6.1 billion in mid-2001 to 9.3 billion by 2050. The 49 least-developed countries will nearly triple in size, from 668 million to 1.86 billion people, according to the United Nations Population Division's World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. These latest estimates and projections by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs indicate that world population is now growing by 1.3 per cent, or 77 million people per year. Six countries account for half of this growth: India (with 21 per cent of the total increase), China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Some commentators have selectively emphasized the trends of ageing and declining populations in parts of the world to argue that continued concern about global population growth is unwarranted. The facts suggest otherwise: as many people will be added in the next 50 years as were added in the past 40 years; and the increase will be concentrated in the world's poorest countries, which are already straining to provide basic social services to their people...."

At such a challenging time, it was of course disappointing that politics should have played such a great role in President Bush's recent decision to remove funds from the U.N. Population Fund. As this BBC note from India shows, this move will only worsen the possibility of there being more abortions because of the lack of funding for alternative family planning activities in developing countries. 

11/5/02 <link>
Sexual Harassment Law: CA vs. U.S.
Joanna Grossman of FindLaw reports and analyzes a recent California Appeals Court decision denying a sexual harassment claim against the employer, by a female bus driver, Raquel Salazar, who was subject to routine sexual harassment and humiliation by passengers. The Appeals Court did not deny that sexual harassment had occurred but they interpreted the California legal statute on employer liability to mean that employers cannot control customers and are therefore not liable to be held guilty of promoting sexual harassment. Grossman disagrees (and so do we) with this decision, especially because:
(a) The California legal statute does not necessarily rule out employer responsibility entirely, especially when placing employees in front of harmful customers is something employers have some control over, and
(b) Federal statutes protect employees and do hold employers responsible for harassment by customers to some extent, suggesting that the California court could have relied on logic rather than interpret California's statutes too narrowly.
Ultimately, balance is key. Employers who show they are willing to address the complaints of employees effectively should face less burden on liabilities. We hope this case goes to the Federal courts, but we also trust that some wise legislator adds a Bill soon in CA to clarify the nature of the law! 

10/26/02 <link>
More reasons why gun-control is going nowhere
This USA Today article depicts the sad truth surrounding the D.C. -area serial killer-sniper case. USA Today says, "...Three restraining orders stemming from domestic violence barred John Allen Muhammad, one of the suspects, from possessing a firearm. The Bushmaster semiautomatic rifle that was confiscated when he was arrested was sold to a distributor in Washington state in June. If it turns out that Muhammad bought it at a gun show after the orders were issued, that could give new life to a bill requiring background checks of prospective buyers at such events...."
New life to a gun-control bill? Not in our dreams. As long as gun-friendly rural America controls the balance of power in the United States, our lawmakers (including Democrats) will be loathe to take principled stands on this topic (e.g., see this New York Times article). Indeed, as was reported earlier, the clout of the NRA today is so high that Attorney General John Ashcroft decided not to enforce Brady Act provisions to establish the ownership of guns by all those arrested in connection with 9/11. 

The sniper case is more in a growing list that shows how woeful the control over illegal weapons are in this country. The grave dangers this poses is illuminated not only by the sniper case, but also the relative ease with which criminals or terrorists in the U.S. could use lethal weapons (not necessarily those of mass destruction) to take hostages, like in the deadly Moscow caseSpending hundreds of billions of dollars in military defense provides no recourse to suicide attacks, random killings, bioterror, chemical weapons attacks, or hostage situations within the U.S. by terrorists who will do anything including taking their own lives, to make their point. The recent report of the Hart-Rudman panel is devastating since it basically says that the U.S. is significantly unprepared for these kinds of terrorist attacks, a year after 9/11. To quote them, "...The survey, conducted over the past eight weeks, found that: local police officials have limited access to intelligence reports on suspected terrorists; only a small number of ships and containers entering American seaports are inspected; most emergency workers are ill equipped to handle biological and chemical attacks; and fire and police officials in most cities do not have radios that allow them to communicate with each other....

Our point in highlighting this is that fixing the known loopholes within the U.S. is much less expensive and more critical than going to war with Iraq today. An example - something as simple as reinforcing airplane cockpit doors prior to 9/11, when the Government knew about numerous hijacking threats, could have helped reduce the possibility of the devastating murders on 9/11. Another example, relevant to the sniper case, is evident from this MSNBC article: "...Ten full days before the sniper attacks began in Maryland, one of the two suspects in the case left his fingerprint on a magazine at the slaying scene in Montgomery, Ala., police said. But investigators were unable to link the fingerprint with a name — Malvo’s — until a month later because of delays in processing the evidence. By that time, all 13 shootings in the Washington region had occurred. Some authorities speculated that if Malvo had been linked to the Alabama crime before the sniper shootings, the Caprice might have drawn more suspicion. Detectives might have linked Malvo to Muhammad, and the car is registered to Muhammad. But the fingerprint was sent to the Alabama Bureau of Investigation for processing, according to federal officials in Washington. The ABI is set up to run prints only against state criminal records, federal officials said. The original print was not forwarded to the FBI for comparison with federal fingerprint records, the officials said. After the sniper connection was made, the FBI processed the print in its Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, two officials said. The system includes fingerprints provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in deportation cases, the officials said. Malvo’s prints were filed there. Alabama does not subscribe to the FBI fingerprint system, which was created in 1999. Fewer than half the states have signed on as participants, officials said [our emphasis]." The truth is that evidence continues to mount that terrorists and criminals within the U.S. pose greater harm in the near-term, to the United States and its people, than Saddam Hussein.  

In the context of gun control, the fact is that some of the NRA's most extreme positions on "gun rights" are not a political issue - but they reflect something devoid of morality. Preserving the lives of thousands who die from gun violence cannot possibly be less important than preserving the rights to own weapons, which increasingly have value only against other humans. Indeed, we don't even agree that the right to wantonly kill animals - something euphemistically referred to as a "sport" (hunting) - is more important than preserving the lives of animals that Nature (or God) created. We would find it understandable if limited gun ownership rights for self-defense continue (as long as a limited set of weapons are defined for this purpose), but not for buying machine guns or assault rifles!

Gun-rights advocates such as the NRA often use the catch phrase that "guns don't kill people, people do". We are not sure if there is a more specious argument. Of course people are responsible for shootings, but that doesn't mean gun manufacturers can shift their responsibility for product safety to the buyers. Imagine if GM or Ford started saying "cars don't cause accidents, people do". The fact that guns are amongst the most lethal objects that are not regulated by the consumer products safety division should be raising alarms everywhere in this country, but they aren't. Imagine extending the NRA's argument to more lethal weapons. For instance - would anyone even be sane enough to let random people buy chemical weapons or biological weapons legally under the egregious (hypothetical) argument that "chemical or biological weapons don't kill people, people do"? We are sure that won't happen, but this illustrates the fact that nice sounding catch phrases don't address the problem or provide a solution.

Finally, want to know how easily kids or adults can buy guns in your state? Click here to get an idea. We will return to this topic in the near future, with some data.

10/21/02 <link>
Death penalty for juveniles
Having made a landmark judgment earlier this year that the death penalty for mentally retarded individuals is "cruel and unusual" and thus unconstitutional, a strongly divided  Supreme Court unfortunately declined to hear an appeal on a death penalty case for an individual who was 17 years old when he committed a heinous rape/murder. This essentially means that the legality of executions of 16 or 17 year olds is preserved in those states that allow it, without further debate. 
In the U.S., adults are considered to be those who are 18 years or older. Does this mean someone who is 16 or 17 years old is ignorant of the consequences of his or her actions. Of course not. So, in principle, as long as convictions show that the act was heinous, that the individual knew what he or she was doing, and proved beyond any doubt that the person convicted was really the killer, one might argue for the death penalty in those cases. 
However
, the fact of the matter is that individuals under the age of 18 are NOT legally considered adults, even though they may *BE* adults in every sense of the word. On the one hand we deny individuals who are 16 and 17 the acknowledgement that they may be as thoughtful and mature as legal adults. We also deny them rights that legal adults possess (e.g., voting, drinking, etc.). This then raises the question as to whether it is not hypocrisy to conveniently subject 16 or 17 years old to laws and penalties that one should be applying to adults? 
To be continued...!

10/16/02 <link>
Foetus has self-defense rights but mother has abortion rights?
Adam Liptak reports on a rather interesting case that is sure to rattle abortion rights supporters. A unanimous 3-judge Michigan Appeals Court has ruled that Jaclyn Kurr, 16-17 weeks pregnant with quadruplets, had the right to use deadly force against her lover/attacker (to the point of killing him) even though the latter did not attempt to kill her but actually punched her in the stomach. The Court simultaneously noted that the age of the foetuses clearly prevented them from being able to survive outside the womb and that, therefore, she could legally have aborted the foetuses consistent with Roe v. Wade
Liptak also reports that "...about half the states have laws making assaults that cause miscarriages or stillbirths criminal...Michigan law allows people to use deadly force to defend themselves when they believe their lives are in danger or when they feel threatened by serious bodily harm. Ms. Kurr failed to persuade the jury that the punches amounted to either. The law there allows the use of deadly force in defense of others. The [initial] trial judge ruled that the fetuses Ms. Kurr was carrying were not "others" for these purposes. 'I believe in order to be able to assert a defense of others there has to be a living human being existing independent of your client,' Judge Richard Lyon Lamb of the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court, said to Ms. Kurr's lawyer. 'Under 22 weeks, there are no others.'...[However,] In reversing the conviction, the appeals court held that the concept of defending others 'should also extend to the protection of a fetus, viable or nonviable, from an assault against the mother.' The court stressed that it recognized the defense only in the context of an assault [our emphasis], thus excluding the destruction of embryos existing outside the body and medical abortions..."
One of the questions this decision raises then, is how one defines assault. Isn't it a very thin line between "using an intrusive and painful medical procedure for abortion" and calling it an "assault on the foetus"? If we say that a person has the legal right to abort a foetus while simultaneously saying the foetus is an "other" that has a legal right against being destroyed by an "assault", then it seems we should definitely expect a lot more assaults on Roe v. Wade. More on this intriguing case later.

10/7/02 <link>
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Mercy-killing)
We have just learned that the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the highly publicized case of Jack Kevorkian, convicted in Michigan of second-degree murder for the mercy-killing of a patient suffering from Lou-Gehrig's disease. While this is a topic of extreme importance, we suspect that the high court's turning it down may partly spur the need for greater discussion and create more mature laws that might have more legal standing in the long run. In this context, some of us may also recall the unsuccessful efforts (so far) of Attorney General Ashcroft to try and overturn the state of Oregon's unique (in the nation) Physician-Assisted Suicide Law - called the "Death with Dignity Act". Back in April 2002, a Federal Judge dismissed Ashcroft's lawsuit. It would be surprising if Ashcroft did not fight this at the U.S. Supreme Court.
Assisted Suicide (performed by doctors or patients upon the request of patients) and Euthanasia (mercy killing performed by doctors but not necessarily with the patient's consent) are intense topics on which significant open-minded debate needs to occur. On the one hand, any pertinent laws on these issues *cannot* simply be determined by public opinion since death is after all as personal an experience as life. However, without public support, such laws would obviously have no chance of passing. (It must be noted that while the most recent evidence we have seen to-date (1999 Gallup Poll) indicates that a majority of the U.S. public supports assisted-suicide, we believe a lot more data needs to be collected on this controversial topic, with detailed questions, to realize any value from such polls). 
While we are inclined to think that a person should have the right to end one's life to avoid immense pain and suffering, we do believe that some of the ramifications of allowing this legally should be considered very carefully to avoid intentional or unintentional abuse. Indeed, the risk of overuse or incorrect use of Assisted Suicide or Euthanasia laws makes us extremely nervous, especially in light of the recent research findings that nearly 90% of patients who ask for assisted suicide, may actually change their minds later on! More on this topic later.

10/6/02 <link>
More on the Death Penalty, this time from Illinois
Republican Illinois Gov. George Ryan (who some of you may recall declared a moratorium on the death penalty back in Jan 2000) has started holding mass clemency hearings for death penalty convicts. This is sure to spark even more serious debate and anger on this topic. This comes on the heels of recent Federal Court judgments declaring the death penalty constitutional. (As an aside, ever wonder how the GOP's right-wing would have reacted if a Democratic Gov. did this?) 
In general, we are in favor of the death penalty, not the least because we find no compelling reason to provide our tax dollars to keep heinous criminals alive and well. But, we are more than willing to concede that the death penalty statute requires serious review to determine how to avoid sending innocent people to their deaths. Also important is to make sure that laws governing death penalty decisions are objective and uniformly applied. Gov. Ryan may potentially leave a worthy legacy on this specific issue, because he is not necessarily calling for a ban on it altogether, but rather a reform of the laws. In that sense we support his effort, regardless of the transient pain and hurt experienced by the friends and relatives of those murdered. Let's get this right, to ensure the punishment is always just.

9/30/02 <link>
More on gun laws - this time from our favorite state CA
This is an interesting, different twist to the Second Amendment right to bear arms (see our earlier note on this below). The lawsuit here relates to a letter from the ATF to Taurus International Manufacturing (maker of guns) which said, among other things, "If your corporation determines that there is an unusually high number of Taurus firearms being traced to certain [wholesalers and dealers], we suggest that you look at their business practices more carefully." Taurus apparently never bothered to do much with this. As the NYT article states, "...Studies by the firearms bureau have shown that about 1 percent of dealers account for about half of all guns used in crimes, meaning that a few dealers appear to be responsible for selling thousands of guns to criminals..." The catch of course is that what Taurus has done (or not done) is not overtly illegal. The CA cities suing the gun manufacturer are relying on past history relating to cases involving toxic chemicals, to try and extend that to gun manufacturers. As the Times states, "...federal courts have ruled that when a manufacturer of a dangerous product knows that its sellers are engaged in hazardous practices, the manufacturer may be held liable. For example, makers of toxic chemicals have been held liable for selling barrels of their products to companies they knew were not doing enough to prevent leakage into the ground. The cities also say they believe the gun makers could use information from the firearms bureau's [ATF's] tracing of guns used in crimes to identify dealers who sell a disproportionate number of those guns, and stop selling to them." We will certainly watch this lawsuit with interest. (This reminds us of a past Law and Order episode which we thoroughly enjoyed.)

9/28/02  <link>
Executive Privilege or Desire to hide unpleasant facts?
Vice-President Dick Cheney provokes a legal war between the Executive and Legislative branches, for the first time in the 81-year history of the General Accounting Office of the U.S. Congress. Mr. Cheney invokes Executive Privilege over his decision to hide from public view the identities of those energy executives who wrote his Energy Policy for him. The ruling is expected from a Republican-appointed Federal judge sometime soon - so we're not inclined to hold our breath very much. On the other hand, we believe the judge (and the Supreme Court - if the case made it up to there) would be making a big mistake by awarding Executive Privilege on this case. If the judges are smart enough they will recognize that a Government unfavorable to their political leanings may put forward similar arguments in the future (on obviously privilege-less issues such as this one), and their decision today will have far-flung repercussions for Government and Democracy in general. (Just imagine what would have happened, if a future Bill Clinton invoked Executive Privilege on everything and got away with it.)

9/27/02 <link>
Second Amendment: Right to Bear Arms - for militia or individuals?
Dahlia Lathwick writes in Slate about the attempt by Attorney General John Ashcroft to try and rewrite decades of legal precedent by trying to reinterpret the Second Amendment to allow individuals to bear arms, with the caveat of "reasonable regulation" attached. As an example, she cites a recent Texas case U.S. v. Emerson, where the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to reinterpret the law in like fashion (overturning the precedent originally set by the Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Miller), while holding on to the gun regulation imposed on the defendant Emerson due to the facts of this particular case. What is interesting is that Ashcroft's Justice Department, in Emerson's appeal to the Supreme Court, has reversed the stand the previous Justice Department took in the same case, by filing a brief supporting the individual's right to bear arms, while continuing to maintain that in this particular case the defendant is subject to the "reasonable regulation" caveat! The inconsistency of this position is mind-boggling. (Unfortunately, as Lathwick points out, the Supreme Court refused to hear this case, keeping this highly critical law in legal limbo). 

It is difficult to understand how the Bush administration and Attorney General Ashcroft could possibly be pushing this view of the Second Amendment at a time when curbing weapons access to terrorists should be their foremost effort. As Lathwick points out, defendants have gleefully attached motions on gun-possession cases citing this new interpretation of the law by the same organization that should be fighting them. And Mr. Ashcroft is continuing to attach the legally weak "reasonable regulation" caveat to his new interpretation of the Second Amendment. Incidentally, Lathwick points out, "...For instance, last fall, Ashcroft blocked the FBI from using gun purchase records gathered under the auspices of the federal Brady Act to determine if any of the 1,200 suspected terrorists detained after Sept. 11 had purchased a gun. This is the man who didn’t hesitate to lock these same people up for months without charges, insisting that looking into their gun records violated their privacy...." This is to be juxtaposed with Mr. Ashcroft's promise at his confirmation hearings, "...being attorney general means advancing the national interest, not advocating my personal interest.

9/24/02  <link>
The death penalty 
Another Federal judge declares the death penalty unconstitutional. Again, a decision based on the findings of many innocents being put to death

9/17/02 <link>
First Amendment: Free-speech or Terrorism? - books teaching chemical and biological weapon production 

In a brief op-ed, Nicholas Kristof highlights this menace and the legal/philosophical questions surrounding free speech. Free speech is nice and great, but distributing manuals for making weapons of mass destruction freely is no joke and should NOT be protected under "free speech"! It's more like free terrorism! Pornography is far less a problem for our society (when was the last time it killed thousands at a time?) and THAT is more controlled.