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MEDIA - LIARS/SPINNERS INC.
This section explores media bias, incompetence, fraud and journalistic malpractice

U.S. MEDIA and the SELLING OF THE IRAQ WAR
Part I: The New York Times

5/31/04

What was exceedingly clear about the Iraq war a long time ago is now apparently becoming "clear" to some of the media "elite" in the United States. A particular case, worth examining, is that of the New York Times. The Times is, for better or worse, considered a leading newspaper in this country and an influential one at that, because its newsrooms and reporting do influence news coverage across the country. Given that, it is important to understand how this newspaper responded to the Bush administration's "marketing" of the Iraq invasion (war) to the people of the United States, and how it is dealing with the repercussions of what was/is one of the most expensive (in dollars and lives) fraudulent/deceptive acts perpetrated on the American people. 

More than anything else, to me, this page is a personal reference for the future. It is an important reminder of what happens when the media become largely divorced from what ought to be the principal reason for their existence - objective and truthful journalism. Of course, it is hardly my suggestion that media should not set profits as a goal (from a business standpoint). After all, without adequate profitability, it is hard to sustain good journalism. But when an over-emphasis on profits (via front page "exclusives"), was combined with a misplaced sense of "patriotism" since 9/11 (which is an overly generous characterization of the mainstream media's long-standing willingness to be part of the Bush administration's "coalition of the willing"), and a desire to be considered "not liberal" in the eyes of powerful conservatives and right-wing organizations and media, the result was not likely to be "journalism". Thus, this deadly mixture, as expected, produced a combustible product, the impact of which has just started to filter through to the powers-that-be in the mainstream U.S. media today.

What happened at the New York Times is merely a symptom of all that started to go wrong with American journalism since the early 1990s. Lest this page provides a misleading picture, by first covering the Times' conduct here it is not my intention to portray the Times as somehow being the worst offender on the Iraq war. Rather, it is intended to show two separate things. One, that if the so-called "liberal media" in this country behaved like this, one can only imagine how the conservative media cheer-led during this time period. Two, to remind people of what he said.

Since the early 1990s, the New York Times has systematically destroyed its reputation as a newspaper, by willingly, and sometimes brazenly, participating in one fake witch-hunt after another. Put generously, it became a willing pawn in the hands of the Republican/GOP power machine (a convenient short-form that I use to describe a group that comprises of deceptive or downright fraudulent right-wing media, foundations and key Republican members of Congress)  - a machine that has over the years become honed to systematically deceive the vast majority of the American public. Put somewhat more objectively, the Times' management indulged in one piece of journalistic malpractice after another. (Some clarifications: I am referring here largely to the Times' coverage on issues that have significant political impact or overtones. My statement does not mean that the Times did not cover some issues or topics with reasonable objectivity and respect for the truth. Clearly, if the Times practiced real journalism, that in itself should not be a reason for critics to necessarily applaud it - for, simply doing one's job should not be a reason for accolades in a normal world). Reminding ourselves about the Times' past "journalism" that was similarly or more spectacularly lacking (compared to its Iraq coverage) is therefore worthwhile because it provides additional context to what happened

This page, therefore, addresses three aspects:

1. HISTORY: The New York Times, before the year 2001

2. IRAQ: The New York Times' coverage of the Iraq war (prior to May 2004)

3. THE FUTURE: The New York Times' position today and what it portends for the future

CONCLUSION


1. HISTORY: The Times political coverage before the year 2001

This section is sub-divided into two parts. The first part covers the Times' coverage of the Clinton-Gore administration and the second addresses its coverage of Al Gore in Election 2000.

A. The Times' coverage of the Clinton/Gore administration

In my opinion, the Times' coverage of the Clinton administration (especially Whitewater) perhaps constituted a nadir in the integrity and quality of its journalism, even more than its coverage of the Iraq war. The reason is that at least in the context of the Iraq war, there has been an attempt made to slightly balance the coverage with facts (mostly belatedly).

A number of good books have been written documenting the role (read, malpractice) of the mainstream and right-wing media in promoting numerous fake scandals during the Clinton administration's reign. The one I recommend the most is The Hunting of the President, written by Joe Conason and Gene Lyons. More than any other book, it documents how the media allowed itself to get trapped in political muckraking in the first place, and became a significant "original" contributor to it subsequently, with a premium placed on sensationalism over truth. The New York Times' role in hunting Bill and Hillary Clinton is well described by the book. Of course, I am also looking forward to the documentary based on the book - which is probably expected to hit theatres in the U.S. in late Summer/Fall 2004. Three other books are also worth reading, in this context - Sidney Blumenthal's The Clinton Wars, David Brock's Blinded by the Right and Gene Lyons' Fools for Scandal

The specific role played by the Times (especially its "star" reporter Jeff Gerth) in pumping up the fake "Whitewater scandal" is briefly examined by Gene Lyons in this Harper's article. This is worth reading because it epitomizes the era and the Times' participation in it.

So how did we get here? Well, at the expense of shocking you, dear reader, it all began with the New York Times--specifically with a series of much-praised articles by investigative reporter Jeff Gerth: groundbreaking, exhaustively researched, but not particularly fair or balanced stories that combine a prosecutorial bias and the art of tactical omission to insinuate all manner of sin and skulduggery. Accompanied by a series of indignant editorials, Gerth's work helped create a full-scale media clamor last December for a special prosecutor. Testimony in recent Senate hearings showed that the Resolution Trust Corporation's Whitewater investigation began in direct response to the Times coverage; the hearings themselves resulted in large part from the Clinton Administration's panicky reaction to reporters' queries about the RTC probe, Gerth's among them. Absent the near-talismanic role of the New York Times in American journalism, the whole complex of allegations and suspicions subsumed under the word "Whitewater" might never have made it to the front page, much less come to dominate the national political dialogue for months at a time. It is all the more disturbing, then, that most of the insinuations in Gerth's reporting are either highly implausible or demonstrably false.
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The theory implicit in Gerth's Times stories may be summarized as follows: when his business partner and benefactor McDougal got in trouble, Bill Clinton dumped the sitting Arkansas securities commissioner and appointed a hack, Beverly Bassett Schaffer. He and Hillary then pressured Bassett Schaffer to grant McDougal special favors--until the vigilant feds cracked down on Madison Guaranty, thwarting the Clintons' plan. This is the Received Version of the Whitewater scandal as it first took shape in the pages of the New York Times--what all the fuss is ultimately about. And it bears almost no relation to reality.
The distortions begin with the headline of the original Gerth story in the Times: CLINTONS JOINED S.&L. OPERATOR IN AN OZARK REAL-ESTATE VENTURE. This headline was misleading because when Bill and Hillary Clinton entered into the misbegotten partnership to subdivide and develop 230 forested acres along the White River as resort property in 1978, Jim McDougal wasn't involved in the banking and S&L businesses at all. He was a career political operative--a former aide to Senators J. William Fulbright and John L. McClellan. In the meantime, McDougal had done well in the inflation-fueled Ozarks land boom of the Seventies. But it wouldn't be until five years later--by which time the Whitewater investment was already moribund--that he bought a controlling interest in Madison Guaranty.
Details, details. Gerth wrote that McDougal quickly built Madison "into one of the largest state-chartered associations in Arkansas." Wrong again. Among thirty-nine S&Ls listed in the 1985 edition of Sheshunoff's Arkansas Savings and Loans, Madison ranked twenty-fifth in assets and thirtieth in amount loaned. These errors of detail might be forgiven if Gerth had in fact uncovered a conspiracy between the Clintons and the Arkansas securities commissioner to treat Jim McDougal leniently. The appearance of conspiracy, however, was created not by the actions of the alleged parties but by selective reporting.
Consider, for example, Gerth's treatment of the appointment of Beverly Bassett Schaffer as Arkansas securities commissioner in his March 8, 1992, article: "After Federal regulators found that Mr. McDougal's savings institution, Madison Guaranty, was insolvent, meaning it faced possible closure by the state, Mr. Clinton appointed a new state securities commissioner...." The clear implication is that in response to a Federal Home Loan Bank Board report dated Januuary 20, 1984, suggesting that Madison might be insolvent, Clinton in January 1985 installed Bassett Schaffer as Arkansas securities commissioner for the purpose of protecting McDougal.
So how come he waited an entire year? In reality, the timing of Bassett Schaffer's appointment had nothing to do with the FHLBB report, which there's no reason to think Clinton knew about. (The Clintons had no financial stake in Madison Guaranty, although that, too, has been obscured.) The fact is that Bill Clinton had to find a new commissioner in January 1985 because the incumbent, Lee Thalhiemer, had resigned to reenter private practice. Appointed by Republican Governor Frank White and kept on by Clinton, Thalhiemer says he told Gerth this in an interview, and describes the Times version as "unmitigated horseshit."
Bassett Schaffer strenuously insists that to this day she has never met McDougal, never heard Bill Clinton mention his name, and does not believe he influenced her appointment--and told Gerth so. She had actively sought the job from the moment she learned that Thalhiemer was quitting (he confirms recommending her to Clinton). She herself had volunteered in Clinton's 1974 congressional campaign and had worked for him full time on the Arkansas attorney general's staff while in law school. And her brother, Woody Bassett, also a Fayetteville attorney, was a personal friend and supporter of Bill Clinton.
The claim that Jim McDougal was behind Bassett Schaffer's appointment rests entirely on the word of McDougal himself, a victim of manic-depressive illness whose lawyer filed an insanity plea in a 1990 bank-fraud trial in U.S. District Court, in which McDougal was ultimately found not guilty. In his original 1992 article, Gerth had acknowledged McDougal's history of emotional illness but described him as "stable, careful and calm." By 1993 mention of those difficulties had all but vanished from the pages of the New York Times--despite the fact that the supposed recipient of Bill Clinton's largess was living in Arkadelphia in a trailer on SSI disability payments. Also unmentioned, for what it's worth, was that McDougal had long since recanted his accusations against Clinton and taken to blaming the whole mess on Republican partisans in the RTC.
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When I asked him recently about the discrepancies and omissions in his reporting, Jeff Gerth stood his ground, alternately argumentative and defensive, and did not wish to be quoted. He argues, for example, that he never literally wrote that Jim McDougal had in fact gotten Bassett Schaffer the job, merely that he'd claimed to. Her denial struck him as beside the point. In other instances, he pleaded limitations of time and space.
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The same faults that mar Jeff Gerth's reporting on Whitewater--misleading innuendo and ignorance or suppression of exculpatory facts--also showed up in the Times accounts of Hillary Rodham Clinton's commodity trades with Springdale attorney Jim Blair and her husband's dealings with Tyson Foods. "During Mr. Clinton's tenure in Arkansas," Gerth wrote near the top of his March 18, 1994, front-page account, "Tyson benefited from a variety of state actions, including $9 million in government loans, the placement of company executives on important state boards and favorable decisions on environmental issues." The alleged $9 million in loans was the implied quid pro quo for old pal Blair's generous tips to Hillary in the 1970s that helped her turn $ 1,000 into nearly $ 100,000.
Following Gerth's report, the incriminating $9 million figure appeared virtually everywhere. The Times itself weighed in with a March 31 editorial called "Arkansas Secrets," attacking the "seedy appearances" of Bill and Hillary Clinton's "extraordinary indifference to...the normal divisions between government and personal interests." The same editorial went on to deride what it called "the Arkansas Defense": that "you cannot apply the standards of the outside world to Arkansas, where a thousand or so insiders run things in a loosey-goosey way that may look unethical or even illegal to outsiders." Nor have Times editorial writers been the only ones to scold the Clintons for succumbing to the lax moral climate of the president's native state. The Baltimore Sun, Spiro Agnew's hometown paper, opined that the First Lady's adventures in the cow trade "certainly don't smell right, especially considering that Jim Blair represented a giant, influential agribusiness firm in Arkansas that later received what seemed to be favors from Gov. Clinton."
Newsweek's Joe Klein wrote of the President's "multiple-personality disorder," involving a moderate Clinton, a liberal Clinton, and "the likely suspect in the Whitewater inquiry, a pragmatic power politician who did whatever necessary to get and keep office in Arkansas...granting low-interest loans to not-very-needy business interests, who in turn contributed generously to his political campaigns. This Clinton snuggled up close to the Arkansas oligarchs, the bond daddies and chicken pluckers--and never quite escaped the orbit of the shadowy Stephens brothers, Witt and Jackson." (Witt Stephens has been dead for three years, and Jack Stephens is a Reagan Republican who has bankrolled nearly every Clinton opponent--except Sheffield Nelson--since the early 1980s.)
There's just one problem with this chorus of self-righteous denunciation: the $9 million in loans that inspired it never existed. Especially attentive readers of the New York Times may have noticed an odd little item in the daily "Corrections" column on April 20, 1994:
An article on March 18 about Hillary Rodham Clinton's commodity trades misstated benefits that the Tyson Foods company received from the state of Arkansas. Tyson did not receive $9 million in loans from the state; the company did benefit from at least $ 7 million in state tax credits, according to a Tyson spokesman.
Gerth blames a chart misread on deadline.
But was the Times embarrassed? Hardly. In the journalistic equivalent of double jeopardy, the Times editors, having convicted Hillary Clinton on a spurious charge, decided she was guilty of a new charge: helping Tyson Foods to that $ 7 million in tax credits. No sooner had she held her April 22 press conference on Whitewater-related issues than the Times fretted that the First Lady's performance had been smooth but cleverly evasive. Particularly suspicious, an April 24 editorial found, were her dealings with Jim Blair, "a lawyer for Tyson Foods, a large company that was heavily regulated by and received substantial tax credits from the Arkansas government." Emphasis added. And people call the President slick!
The truth is far less lurid. The $7 million in investment tax credits Tyson Foods claimed against its Arkansas state tax bill after 1985--that is, between seven and fourteen years after Hillary's commodity trades--were written into the state's revenue code and were never Bill Clinton's to bestow or withhold. True, the Clinton Administration did sponsor the 1985 legislation that created the tax credits. It did so under strong pressure, not from Tyson but from International Paper, which threatened to take its processing plants elsewhere unless Arkansas matched tax breaks available from other states--a potentially severe economic blow to the already poor southern half of the state. Far from being unique to Arkansas, state investment tax credits are now the rule from sea to shining sea. One week after the Times made its lame correction, Tyson announced the opening of a new plant in Portland, Indiana. According to a press release by Indiana Governor Evan Bayh, the state and local governments provided some $9 million in economic incentives--approximately equal to what Tyson got from Arkansas during Bill Clinton's six terms.
Elsewhere, nearly every bit of evidence cited as proof of shady connections between the Clintons and Tyson Foods in the Times March 18, 1994, front-page story got the familiar Gerth treatment. Besides the imaginary $9 million in loans, Gerth cited several other suspicious transactions, among them a bitter court battle over polluted groundwater in the town of Green Forest in which the Clinton Administration "failed to take any significant action," and a pair of seemingly tainted appointments--including renaming a Tyson veterinarian to the state Livestock and Poultry Commission and Jim Blair to the University of Arkansas board. An objective account of the court battle would have pointed out that the city of Green Forest was itself a defendant in the same lawsuit. Bill Clinton was not. Officials of the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology testified for the plaintiffs against Tyson Foods. So much for yet another dark Clintonian conspiracy.
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All of this raises the really interesting question at the heart of the Whitewater scandal: why--with representatives of the vaunted national press camped out in Little Rock for weeks at a time, squinting over aged public documents and pontificating nightly at the Capital Hotel bar--has nobody blown the whistle on Gerth and the New York Times? There are several reasons, ambition and fear among them. It is always safest to run with the pack, and editors who invest thousands of dollars on a scandal don't normally want to hear that there's no scandal to be found. Reporters who have challenged aspects of the official version, like Greg Gordon and Tom Hamburger of the Minneapolis Star Tribune and John Camp of CNN, have not found their celebrity enhanced. Those who have tried to split the difference, like the reporters for Time magazine--which has always reported (albeit parenthetically) that Arkansas bank regulators treated Madison Guaranty sternly--have ended up producing accounts as muddled and self-referential as a John Barth novel. "The dealings in question," Time's George Church wrote last January 24, "are so complex that it is difficult even to summarize the suspicions they arouse, let alone cite the evidence supporting such suspicions. ... Violations of law, if any, would be extremely difficult to prove." And people call Clinton mealymouthed.
Regional bias and cultural condescension play a part, too. How could the New York Times be wrong and the Arkansas Times be right? But even if Bill Clinton had been governor of Connecticut instead of Arkansas, in the post-Watergate, post-everythinggate culture no reporter wishes to appear insufficiently prosecutorial--particularly not when the suspects are the President and his wife. By definition they've got to be guilty of something; it may as well be Whitewater.

Another "scandal" hyped by the Times was the Wen Ho Lee affair. This was another egregious piece of "journalism" - which did in the end elicit an apology of sorts from the Times.  Guess who the "star" reporter was in that case? Jeff Gerth! Of course, there were others as well.

As Eric Boehlert wrote in Salon.com:

How big a mess had the New York Times' coverage of the Wen Ho Lee spy case become for the paper of record? So big that its editors created a whole new forum to explain it to its readers.
Tuesday, on page A-2, the Times ran its first ever "assessment," in which its editors revisited the paper's controversial work in the Lee case. Traditionally, the Times has used "corrections" to address factual missteps, and the "editor's note" to explain lapses of fairness, balance or perspective. Now, there are assessments. (However, when the Times' original March 6, 1999, story on Wen Ho Lee is recalled on the Lexis-Nexis electronic database, the article comes complete with today's editor's assessment as an appendix, subtitled "Correction.")

Carefully crafted and qualified like a lawyer-vetted brief, the story, with its front-page teaser and 1,500-word spread, will certainly be remembered as one of the Times' most dramatic explorations of its own shortcomings. At times a laundry list of coulda, shoulda, wouldas, the appraisal is both candid and defensive, admitting both serious, journalistic blemishes while steadfastly maintaining that the paper's work is, essentially, accurate. Thecoverage, in which the paper uncorked a series of breathless stories in the spring of '99 that painted a dire picture of Chinese espionage at American nuclear laboratories, pointed the finger at Lee and accused the Clinton administration of dragging its feet to combat it, was led by Jeff Gerth. The paper's star investigative reporter, Gerth's earlier investigations include the now-deflated Whitewater scandal (which the Times still adamantly defends) and a 1998 Pulitzer Prize-winning series on satellite technology transfers to China that, in retrospect, now looks badly overhyped.
Tuesday's story (bylined, simply, "From the Editors") found "careful" and "accurate" work from "persistent and fair-minded reporters," but concedes, as critics have for some time, that its Lee coverage should have been more thorough, more balanced and more skeptical of partisans trying to use the story -- and the paper -- to score points against the White House.
"Looking back, we also found some things we wish we had done differently in the course of the coverage to give Dr. Lee the full benefit of the doubt," according to the story.
So what went wrong? Basically, the Times editors took a rare fall: "In those instances where we fell short of our standards in our coverage of this story, the blame lies principally with those who directed the coverage, for not raising questions that occurred to us only later."
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Now that the paper's news chiefs have addressed their critics, some Times watchers are wondering about the editorial page. After all, page editor Howell Raines, relying on (and often celebrating) the reporting of the paper's news section, published several finger-pointing columns about Lee and Chinese espionage last year. Now that editors have conceded the Times' handling of the story was inadequate, will the editorial page fess up too?

The actions of the media overall (during the Clinton years) were perhaps aptly summed up by Professor (of History) Sean Wilentz in Salon.com, after Sidney Blumenthal's book was released:

The historians' verdict was clear: The impeachment drive against President Clinton lacked constitutional and political legitimacy. The journalists' opinion was equally clear: The impeachment was legitimate, and the historians were really a fusty collection of liberal elitists who had no business sticking their noses into public affairs.
Now an extraordinary thing has happened. Journalists from across the political spectrum are finally acknowledging that impeachment was mostly a partisan crusade on trumped-up charges to bring down a popular president. "From the viewpoint of history," the conservative Andrew Sullivan wrote recently in the New York Observer, "it's going to seem deranged." They have conceded that numerous allegations noisily leveled against Clinton and repeated endlessly in the news media of which they are a part have turned out to be bogus.
The occasion for this sea change in conventional wisdom is the publication of Sidney Blumenthal's "The Clinton Wars" and the response to it.
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Even as journalists admit that Blumenthal has the goods to prove what a right-wing circus impeachment really was, they dismiss his revelations as score-settling, and worse -- as "history." The spectacle of the media, having gotten the story wrong in the first place, dismissing the book that gets it right is stunning, even to someone who lived through the actual impeachment.
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Yet in working up their ad hominem cases against Blumenthal, even his journalist critics concede that the book's exposure of the partisan campaign against Clinton that culminated in the impeachment is accurate and persuasive.
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Andrew Sullivan in the New York Observer: "The real value of this book is in its portrait of Mr. Clinton's foes ... .[T]he account Mr. Blumenthal gives of the haplessness and priggishness of Kenneth Starr is riveting stuff. The testimony of Sam Dash, Mr. Starr's ethics advisor, is particularly damning. The insane attempt to actually bring down a President over perjury in a civil suit has not yet been more vividly evoked."
Janet Maslin in the New York Times: "Certainly "The Clinton Wars" can point to baseless, breathless news coverage as a catalyst to the Kafkaesque."
Lev Grossman in Time: "Blumenthal's abiding theme is that Clinton's presidency was the victim of a right-wing political cabal that manipulated the media and the legal system to make mountains out of dunghills, and he makes a surprisingly convincing case by doggedly following countless news stories and allegations to their origins in tainted, planted, unfounded, retracted, distorted, misleading and plain nonexistent evidence."
Bill Bell in the New York Daily News: "No question, the Clintons were dogged by some extremely malignant, ignorant and hypocritical extremists, funded by a few rich conservatives ... .Beyond the settling of grudges and slights, though, is a bigger, dramatic story -- of the impeachment itself -- and Blumenthal's riveting account is sharp, spare and focused. It pulses with the energy of clashing ideologies and strategies and is propelled by the force of the legal, political and reputational stakes involved. It sets the standard for subsequent reports, including the one his Oval Office boss is writing."
Joseph Lelyveld in the New York Review of Books: "Blumenthal holds your attention when he pieces together the various components of what Mrs. Clinton called a "vast right-wing conspiracy," from Little Rock enemies and haters to the lawyers of the Federalist Society who worked their connections to the Office of the Independent Counsel to shift its focus from real estate to sex ... .Disgraceful things did happen. On more than one occasion, an Internet gossip columnist did set the agenda for mainstream news organizations. Stories without sources did gain instant currency. Some were fabricated."
Clearly, looking back, the anti-impeachment historians get to say we told you so. But the more disturbing point is this: Impeachment isn't just "history." Some of the key "right-wing fanatics" who peddled "tainted, planted, unfounded, retracted, distorted, misleading and plain nonexistent evidence" that led to a "Kafkaesque" political "show trial" have more power than ever in politics and the media -- and have, it seems, actually benefited, personally and politically, from their attacks on the Constitution. The current corrected revised accounts by journalists leave the misimpression that only a few marginal right-wing zanies of passing importance were involved in the illegitimate effort to bring Clinton down. As the now uncontested facts around impeachment show, that is hardly the case.

On the web, two of the best sources of information for understanding the Times' and media's role in the "hunting" of Bill and Hillary Clinton are Salon.com and the Daily Howler. This link provides a list of numerous articles showing the bias and malpractice of the Times in its coverage of the Clintons. Using sources, such as those sites (and others), I have attempted to document some (but not all) of the most egregious pieces of "journalism" against the Clintons here.

B. The Times' coverage of Former Vice President Al Gore and Election 2000

The Times continued its journalistic malpractice on its political coverage in a big way during Election 2000. One of the most egregious contributors in its staff was Katharine Seelye - as a cursory examination of these links in Bob Somerby's Daily Howler website show. But she was not alone. Systematic bias against (and a hate for) Al Gore in the media allowed the kind of media fraud that became common in the Whitewater years to continue against Al Gore (even to this day). For instance, the Washington Post, through the ultra-egregious Ceci Connolly had its own claim to infamy.

Jane Hall wrote a piece in the Columbia Journalism Review, which is worth reviewing for starters. Bob Somerby of the Daily Howler noted this back in Dec 1999: 

Jake Tapper, Salon's post-modern man-about-town, was lead guest on Washington Journal. Please remind us to tell C-SPAN officials that we now quote Tapper's word, not our own. Responding to a charge of liberal bias in the media, Tapper became the third major scribe to describe what went on in that press room at Hanover:

TAPPER: Well, I can tell you that the only media bias I have detected in terms of a group media bias was, at the first debate between Bill Bradley and Al Gore, there was hissing for Gore in the media room up at Dartmouth College. The reporters were hissing Gore, and that's the only time I've ever heard the press room boo or hiss any candidate of any party at any event.

Remarkable—and the public has a right to know that the press corps conducts itself so. Earlier, we have described Time's Eric Pooley saying that the press room "erupted in jeering" during Gore's responses that night (see THE DAILY HOWLER, 11/11/99). We have described the Hotline's Howard Mortman saying that the scribes "groaned, laughed and howled" at almost everything Gore said (see THE DAILY HOWLER, 11/3/99). But hundreds of journalists were in the room, and no one—repeat, no one; no one at all—has complained about the press corps' odd conduct.

A small sample of the Times' egregious coverage and the resultant systematic deceiving or defrauding of the American public about Al Gore is captured below - in links (mostly) from the Daily Howler.

Social security plan: Bob Somerby (Daily Howler) on the Times' Katharine "Kit" Seelye:

That reader might also be surprised, however, to read this part of her dissertation:

SEELYE (8): Mr. Gore has been critical of Mr. Bush for devoting $1.3 trillion of the surplus to an across-the-board income tax cut over 10 years. But now, with this new saving plan, Mr. Gore's total of targeted tax cuts comes in at $500 billion over 10 years, twice what he had proposed before and half of Mr. Bush's proposal.

The reader might dismiss Seelye's odd arithmetic as another minor curiosity. For the record, it was the second time in four days that Seelye had described $500 billion as being "half of" $1.3 trillion.
In fact, when Seelye writes about a Gore plan, there is no point too silly, no spin too absurd, to fit into the piece. Why is $500 billion now "half of" $1.3 trillion? Because Seelye wants to offer some spin—Gore has been slamming Bush's tax cut, but the differences aren't all that great. ("Gore will do and say anything to win.")
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But Seelye didn't restrict her clowning to bizarre, minor points about word order. She also engaged in major spinning when she described Gore's proposal itself. It's hardly surprising—that someone willing to repeal basic math might cut a few corners on substance as well. At any rate, here was Seelye's highly tendentious assessment of Gore's proposal. It came early on in her piece:

SEELYE (7): Mr. Gore's plan does two things that Mr. Gore had criticized in the plan offered by Governor Bush, his Republican rival. One, it allows people to invest taxpayer money in the stock market. Two, it substantially increases the amount of the surplus that Mr. Gore would devote to tax cuts.

Both the points which Seelye makes are egregious examples of spin:
Point one: Gore's new plan "allows people to invest taxpayer money in the stock market," Seelye says. But Gore has criticized Bush's plan for investing payroll taxes in the stock market. That strategy, whatever its ultimate merits, does put basic Social Security benefits at risk. Everything done in the new Gore plan would be in addition to basic SS. Is Gore's idea a good one? We don't have a clue. But Gore plainly isn't doing the thing he called "risky" about the Bush proposal.
Point two: Gore (like McCain) has criticized Bush's tax cuts for using up the entire surplus (if not more). Gore's new tax cuts plainly don't do that—especially given the expanded surplus projection that helped allow Gore to propose them. Obviously, Gore hasn't criticized Bush just for offering tax cuts per se; Gore has always proposed tax cuts himself. For the record, by the way, that $1.3 trillion is the Bush campaign's estimate. The Gore estimate of Bush's tax cut is higher.
These points are so basic—so utterly simple—that one marvels at Seelye's presentation. And one is struck by how early on in her reporting she engages in open disputation.

Drug companies: Robert Wright (Slate) on the Times' Sheryl Gay Stolberg:

There was a time—it seems like only yesterday—when a presidential candidate could lambaste the drug industry and expect the New York Times to run a headline like, "Presidential Candidate Lambastes Drug Industry." But that was before an arms race in cynicism swept the world of elite newspapers. These days, a presidential candidate can expect to get the headline that appeared on the front page of Saturday's New York Times: "Gore Tries Pitching Himself As Drug Industry Opponent."
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It seems to me that if you're going to put out a newspaperespecially the newspaper of record—you should have rules governing the cynicism in your headlines. For example: The accompanying story should support the cynicism.
God knows the article in Saturday's Times, written by Sheryl Gay Stolberg, does its best. It says up high that Gore has "cast himself [emphasis added] as a longtime critic" of excessive drug prices. But the article then has to confront an inconvenient fact: Gore is a longtime critic of excessive drug prices. Stolberg herself concedes that Gore's position dates back "to his days as a young Tennessee congressman." So, how does a reporter bent on maintaining the obligatory air of cynicism proceed in the face of this bothersome ideological consistency?
First, make the ideological consistency itself sound vaguely opportunistic. Stolberg's third paragraph begins, "So Mr. Gore is dusting off his Congressional record and past speeches to stake out policies at odds with the manufacturers." Ah, he's a wily one, that Gore—recycling old convictions! And "staking out" policy positions that were already grounded in those convictions!
Second, hint at contradictions without documenting any. "A review of his record, though, and a detailed talk with the vice president make clear that his views are more nuanced than his languages suggests." Imagine—nuance. And in a presidential candidate, no less! But what exactly does "nuance" mean? Does Gore have views or past utterances that contradict anything he has said lately? The article gives no example of any. Instead, we get sentences like this: "And while he argued for greater disclosure of the industry's pricing practices, the vice president allowed that some information probably should remain proprietary." Yep, that's nuance. Book him, Dano.
The indictment also includes this point: "And some of the same drug makers that Mr. Gore now criticizes have hired his friends and advisers to represent them as lobbyists." So what was Gore supposed to do? Have these friends killed? Couldn't a reporter just as logically look at these facts and laud Gore for resisting the pressure of his lobbyist friends?
And, finally: "Mr. Gore has also been a strong supporter of the biotechnology industry, which through collaborations and mergers is becoming part of the prescription-drug business." Yes, a man truly qualified to be president would have anticipated these collaborations and mergers and withheld support for biotech research in light of its impending association with evil corporations. (To do anything less is evidence of nuance!) Or, he could have just waited for the biotech companies to be acquired by the big pharmaceuticals and then have them killed along with those friends of his that the pharmaceutical industry also acquired.
You may think I've carefully culled a few weak sentences from a long, generally strong piece. But these sentences appear almost consecutively at the piece's outset.
...
The responsible thing to do, it seems to me, is for newspapers to save their cynicism for cases in which people are manifestly hypocritical, doing or saying things that are clearly at odds with what they've done or said in the past. If Gore's record on drug prices contains such examples, the Times didn't find them.
By the way, if you turn to the jump page, you'll find—right there under the jump head "Gore Promotes Himself as Industry Opponent"—that Gore champions a far-reaching Medicare prescription drug benefit for senior citizens. Oops—I mean "Gore is positioning himself as a champion of a far-reaching Medicare prescription drug benefit for senior citizens." Pardon my uncool naiveté. 

Canoe Trip: Bob Somerby (Daily Howler) on the Times' Melinda Henneberger:

The Manchester Union Leader, notoriously conservative, went further in its July 24 coverage. It made clear that PG&E releases water on a daily basis; it quoted Clyde Kepala of PG&E saying "the request to lower the dam was routine;" it quoted Kepala saying that such adjustments have been made for other types of groups; and it reported that Kassel had called the Washington Times quotes inaccurate. In short, local papers in New Hampshire and Vermont were providing information that put the event in greater context, although no one really tried to explain the basic question: Why is this "story" a story at all, if the Gore camp didn't make the request?
What a perfect spot for the New York Times, the nation's great paper of record! Why, it was just the time for a major paper to begin to nail down a few facts! A flap now surrounded a leading hopeful, with some evidence that facts were being invented or spun. Surely the Times would bring us some clarity-and help straighten out our invaluable public discourse.
But the New York Times had another plan, involving their ace, Melinda Henneberger. On this day, you will remember, the brilliant scribe with the matchless skills had decided to showcase her wit. In a lead story in the paper's "National Report" pages, accompanied by a large picture of Gore on the river, Henneberger spent five paragraphs, and only five, discussing the facts of the story. She devoted the rest of her piece to silly jokes and worthless discussions of how stiff Gore had seemed, going on to describe his past posture in cars, when he would take those long car trips in the 80s.
Henneberger's article failed to clarify facts. In fact, it almost seemed she was making some up.
Paragraph one: Showing her matchless analytical powers, Henneberger established that Gore's canoe trip had been planned as a slick photo op. But then, when she began to describe what happened next, problems began to surface:

HENNEBERGER: (paragraph 2) Instead, his Presidential campaign drew complaints from local environmentalists after the local utility poured millions of gallons of water into the drought-stricken river on Thursday to raise the level artificially and keep Mr. Gore from the embarrassment of running aground.

But who were these "local environmentalists" (plural) to whom the scribe was referring? The only such person cited by Sammon, or by the Manchester Union Leader, was the aforementioned Kassel. But, the day before Henneberger's piece appeared, Kassel told the AP that he'd been misquoted, and that he wasn't concerned by the water release. Readers were told about this in two New Hampshire papers—but not in the great New York Times. Henneberger never said who the offended environmentalists were—that plural group to whom she'd referred—and she never told readers that the original troubled environmentalist said he wasn't really troubled at all.
Next, Henneberger spent two paragraphs saying the Gore camp denied requesting the release. In her own voice, she explicitly said the decision was made by the river commission. Surely, then, she would go on to explain why her environmentalists were complaining about Gore's campaign—why the environmentalists were aiming complaints at Gore, for something his campaign had not done.
That's right. It wouldn't be the great New York Times if the scribe didn't clarify that. Well sorry, folks. This isn't the Times. Here was Melinda Henneberger's "analysis:"

HENNEBERGER: (3) A spokesman for the Vice President, Chris Lehane, said the campaign had not asked for the water level to be raised. That decision was made by the Connecticut River Joint Commissions...
(5) Sharon Francis, executive director of the joint commissions, acknowledged giving the order, "in the interest of safety and good judgment."
(6) Still, the incident was another misadventure for the campaign—and did little to make the candidate look smoother, looser, or more relaxed, which had been the plan...

There was no explanation of why environmentalists would be angry at Gore, and we never learned who the environmentalists were. There was no explanation of why the event was a misadventure for the campaign. Henneberger proceeded to her endless discussion of how stiff Gore seemed in various contexts, leaving behind a puzzling story which she made no attempt to explain or decipher.

"Gen. Westmoreland chat": Bob Somerby (Daily Howler) on the Times' Melinda Henneberger:

The doctor is IN throughout this piece, whose headline questions a "compulsion to exaggerate." Sadly, the piece starts with a lengthy account of Gore's troubling conduct in telling a thirty-year-old humorous anecdote—not perfectly accurate, one person thinks—about a trick played on him in Nashville as a cub reporter. Of this utter, yowling nonsense, the utterly hopeless New York Times now fashions its bizarre campaign coverage
Our press corps is determined to be unintelligent. But alas! They also love to spin. We couldn't help chuckling when The Doctor's ruminations took her to Fort Rucker in 1970:

HENNEBERGER: [Gore] was occasionally self-aggrandizing [in his interviews with Henneberger], as when he recalled that when he was a low-ranking enlisted man at Fort Rucker, Ala., Gen. William Westmoreland interrupted a formal departure ceremony to chat with him for an incredible 45 minutes. An Army buddy who was there recalled they talked for just a few minutes—five, maybe.

Gore is embellishing again! Surely it's "compulsive!" But of course, that was Henneberger's Spin For The Day. In July, her Spin For The Day was completely different: "Army Private Al Gore was never and could never have been just one of the guys." So on that occasion, she compulsively told the Westmoreland tale just a little bit differently:

HENNEBERGER (7/11): No less than the Army's highest-ranking officer, Gen. William Westmoreland, singled him out during a visit to Fort Rucker, Ala., where Mr. Gore was stationed for more than a year. The Army chief of staff stopped in the middle of a farewell ceremony to pull the young man aside for a private chat—and kept Mr. Gore's superior officers waiting, and watching, while he asked one of the lowest-ranking men on the base for his thoughts on why so many young people opposed the war.

Really! The brass were "kept waiting and watching" while Westmoreland "pulled Gore aside for a private chat," we were told back in July. But that was then, when the scribe had one spin, and this is now, when the spin is "Gore lies." So now we're told it was "just a few minutes"—it was over in the bat of an eye! In a targeted politician, such shifting accounts would be proof of a loathsome "character problem." But at any rate, listen to how Henneberger's husband, Bill Turque, told the Westmoreland story in his recent Gore bio:

TURQUE: At the end of a visit to Rucker, [Westmoreland] was shaking hands with General Oden when he spied Gore, covering the departure for the Army Flyer. [Gore's army friend Bob] Delabar, who was shooting the story for the paper, said it was as if Westmoreland had spotted an old friend. "He said, 'Oh, Al,'" Delabar recalled. As Oden and his staff cooled his heels, Westmoreland walked the young private over to the edge of the tarmac for a conversation that lasted at least ten minutes.

Weird! "Army buddy" Delabar told Henneberger's husband (in 1998) that the conversation lasted ten minutes or longer. Is there some other "Army buddy" who told Henneberger it was "just a few minutes—five, maybe?" Or is Henneberger—sigh—embellishing again? We have a call in requesting the dope, and we'll pass along what we are told.
But what is utterly silly about this? The fact that it was written at all! This White House race concerns Social Security, taxes, nation-building, global warming. And Henneberger wants us to waste our time judging the character of one of the hopefuls based on a recollection of a pointless conversation that is now thirty years old!!

"Love Story": Bob Somerby (Daily Howler) on the Times' Maureen Dowd and Frank Rich:

Later, it would turn out that Time’s report was slightly inaccurate; Tumulty told the New York Times that Gore actually said he had seen a newspaper article saying that he and his wife had been the models (see tomorrow’s DAILY HOWLER). And all agreed that such an article had appeared in the Nashville press. It seems that Tumulty and Pooley had crafted a slightly simpler narration, omitting Gore’s reference to the newspaper piece. And indeed, one can hardly blame them if they failed to foresee the mischief their brief reference might cause.
Because the writers themselves attached little significance to the VP’s comment. They tossed it off as a minor aside in a long article about larger matters. They betrayed no sense that they were somehow being spun, or that Gore had a motive in making his remark--a passing comment made late at night in the course of a two-hour conversation.
But a thousand miles away, in Washington, D.C., Maureen Dowd had a good ear for motive. She hadn’t been on the plane, of course, so she couldn’t know what was actually said; and she had no apparent way to judge the vice president’s tone of voice or intention.
But in a column published after the Time report, Dowd hailed “the week’s most stunning revelation,” and after summarizing what Time had (inaccurately) reported, she offered this assessment:

DOWD: It’s somewhat suspicious that Mr. Gore has chosen this moment to drop the news--unknown even to many close friends and aides. Does he think, going into 2000, that this will give him a romantic glow, or a romantic afterglow? It reminds me of Jackie Kennedy whispering in Teddy White’s ear about “Camelot.”

Of course, things can remind us of other things, but that doesn’t mean they’re connected. And the fact that Dowd was reminded of Jackie O/K doesn’t mean Gore had a motive in making his remark. But in the world of gossip-pundits like Dowd, if something enters your head, you just sit down and type it. By the next week, Dowd and her Times op-ed colleague Frank Rich just knew why Gore made his remark.
“It may seem odd that I keep writing about the most treacly book and movie in modern times,” Dowd wrote, in one of the rare moments in the life of her column when she verges on self-understanding. In fact, in a world full of serious issues to explore, her choice of topics wasn’t odd, it was sad. But four days had passed since she’d last limned Love Story, and now she was tackling the topic again. And now she seemed completely sure why the VP had made his remark:

DOWD: First the vice president, to warm up his image, planted the notion that he and Tipper were the models for Oliver Barrett IV and Jennifer Cavilleri.
There’s wasn’t a word to explain how she knew this, but Frank Rich was completely sure too:
RICH: What’s bizarre, if not all too revealing, about Al Gore’s now inoperative boast to reporters on Air Force Two that he and his wife, Tipper, were the basis for the hero and heroine of “Love Story” is not that he inflated his past but that he would think that being likened to the insufferable preppy Harvard hockey player Oliver Barrett IV was something to brag about in the first place.
Rich hadn’t been on the plane either, of course, but he knew exactly what Gore had intended. In the course of his column, Rich described Gore’s remark as an “effort to overcompensate for his public stiffness;” described it as a “fib” and as “prevaricating;” and said it showed the “disingenuousness” that is the vice president’s “real character problem.”
We often ask, at THE DAILY HOWLER, if college freshmen could possibly get by with work as bad as that of the press corps; and one can only hope that no college freshman could get away with arrant nonsense like this. Neither Rich nor Dowd had been on the plane; neither had heard the VP’s remark; neither had any apparent way to judge the vice president’s motives. One would hope a college teaching assistant would tell a freshman what most college students would already know--that assessing motive is a delicate task, especially when one doesn’t know what was said to begin with.
In fact, by the time Dowd and Rich wrote this last pair of columns, the Times had (incredibly) published a lengthy news story, exploring the very serious Love Story issue. And it became clear in that article, by Melinda Henneberger, that what Gore had actually said was somewhat different from what Time originally reported. (It was also now clear that what Gore said was true.) But none of that bothered the Times’ rapt pundits, as they dreamily typed their impressions of Al. The truth is, they simply loved that story. It was too good to be untrue.

"Fundraising": Bob Somerby (Daily Howler) on the Times' Maureen Dowd:

DOWD: Embarrassingly, W. has already raised $13 million sitting on his porch in Austin, while the Vice President has endured a cross-country marathon and reported only $8.9 million.
Dowd, of course, has no idea if this is “embarrassing” to Gore. But what is “embarrassing” is Dowd’s slick way of spinning the facts on fund-raising. Determined to prove how embarrassed Gore is, Dowd played fast and loose with simple facts.
Dowd’s figure of $13 million for Bush comes from Don Van Atta’s May 16 article:
VAN ATTA: On the frontiers of presidential fund-raising, Gov. George W. Bush of Texas has shattered previous Republican records by raising $13 million with help from “the Pioneers.”
But that is the amount Bush has raised to date. The Gore figure, reported again and again in the press, is the amount raised by March 31:
VAN ATTA: On the Democratic side, both Vice President Gore and former senator Bill Bradley have piled up impressive numbers. Mr. Gore raised $8.9 million in the first three months of this year.
It isn’t possible that Dowd doesn’t know this. Indeed, Van Atta’s article, like many others, specifically mentions that Bush raised $7.6 million by March 31, the campaign’s first formal reporting date.
Dowd badly wanted, in her gloomy Goth way, to say things were “embarrassing” for Gore. But she couldn’t do that by saying that Gore outraised Bush at the first reporting. So she reported Bush’s total for the middle of May--and compared it to Gore’s for the end of March! She then told her readers how “embarrassing” it was that Bush had raised so much more money.
But of course, she didn’t quite tell readers that. Like the politicians whose slickness she claims to despise, Dowd frequently treats herself to deniability. Dowd wrote that Bush had “raised” $13 million, and that Gore had “reported” 8.9. And why did she make that choice of words? Because that way, kids, everything Dowd stated can be defended as literally accurate.
That’s right, readers. It’s exactly the kind of slippery construction Dowd hates in that naughty Bill Clinton. You have to parse every word this gal says!

More on Dowd here.

"Clintonesque, and other garbage": Bob Somerby (Daily Howler) on Gail Collins:

 Gore asked Martin, “How old is your child?” (she was five), and asked if Martin had good insurance (she did). For this, he was savaged all over the press corps. Here was the repulsive Gail Collins, writing in the great New York Times:

COLLINS: Al Gore has a personality without a thermostat, and when he tries to look animated he practically crashes into the wallboard. On Wednesday he hijacked the auditorium early on, begging for a chance to do a pre-debate Q.-and-A. (“This person has a question! Do we have time for his question?”) He tossed in a little Spanish and a long joke, and made endless attempts to create Clintonesque mind-melds with the audience. (“How old is your child, Corey? Are you unionized, Earl?”)
For asking a woman about her sick child, Gore was called—what else?—Clintonesque. A few weeks later, the slow-walking gang on Kurtz’s show had no idea why this was happening.

UPDATE 6/3/04: Digby has a must-read take on Howell Raines latest piece in The Guardian. A definitive illustration of Raines - the trash-talking, corrupt, "elite" gasbag who more than anything else is responsible for destroying the journalistic credibility of the Times.


2. IRAQ: The Times' coverage of the Iraq invasion/war prior to May 2004

Last week, the New York Times issued an apology for its faulty coverage of the events and "evidence" leading up to the Iraq war. Before we review this "apology", it is instructive to see what some media critics were saying about the Times' coverage previously and how people at the Times (and its reporters) had originally responded to that.

Michael Massing, The New York Review of Books (Feb 04):

Now They Tell Us

In recent months, US news organizations have rushed to expose the Bush administration's pre-war failings on Iraq. "Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper," declared a recent headline in The Washington Post. "Pressure Rises for Probe of Prewar-Intelligence," said The Wall Street Journal. "So, What Went Wrong?" asked Time. In The New Yorker, Seymour Hersh described how the Pentagon set up its own intelligence unit, the Office of Special Plans, to sift for data to support the administration's claims about Iraq. And on "Truth, War and Consequences," a Frontline documentary that aired last October, a procession of intelligence analysts testified to the administration's use of what one of them called "faith-based intelligence."
Watching and reading all this, one is tempted to ask, where were you all before the war? Why didn't we learn more about these deceptions and concealments in the months when the administration was pressing its case for regime change—when, in short, it might have made a difference? Some maintain that the many analysts who've spoken out since the end of the war were mute before it. But that's not true. Beginning in the summer of 2002, the "intelligence community" was rent by bitter disputes over how Bush officials were using the data on Iraq. Many journalists knew about this, yet few chose to write about it.
Before the war, for instance, there was a loud debate among intelligence analysts over the information provided to the Pentagon by Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi and defectors linked to him. Yet little of this seeped into the press. Not until September 29, 2003, for instance, did The New York Times get around to informing readers about the controversy over Chalabi and the defectors associated with him. In a front-page article headlined "Agency Belittles Information Given by Iraqi Defectors," Douglas Jehl reported that a study by the Defense Intelligence Agency had found that most of the information provided by defectors connected to Ahmed Chalabi "was of little or no value." Several defectors introduced to US intelligence by the Iraqi National Congress, Jehl wrote, "invented or exaggerated their credentials as people with direct knowledge of the Iraqi government and its suspected unconventional weapons program."
Why, I wondered, had it taken the Times so long to report this? Around the time that Jehl's article appeared, I ran into a senior editor at the Times and asked him about it. Well, he said, some reporters at the paper had relied heavily on Chalabi as a source and so were not going to write too critically about him.
The editor did not name names, but he did not have to. The Times's Judith Miller has been the subject of harsh criticism. Slate, The Nation, Editor & Publisher, the American Journalism Review, and the Columbia Journalism Review have all run articles accusing her of being too eager to accept official claims before the war and too eager to report the discovery of banned weapons after it.[1] Especially controversial has been Miller's alleged reliance on Chalabi and the defectors who were in touch with him. Last May, Howard Kurtz of The Washington Post wrote of an e-mail exchange between Miller and John Burns, then the Times bureau chief in Baghdad, in which Burns rebuked Miller for writing an article about Chalabi without informing him. Miller replied that she had been covering Chalabi for about ten years and had "done most of the stories about him for our paper." Chalabi, she added, "has provided most of the front page exclusives on WMD to our paper."
When asked about this, Miller said that the significance of her ties to Chalabi had been exaggerated. While she had met some defectors through him, she said, only one had resulted in a front-page story on WMD prior to the war. Her assertion that Chalabi had provided most of the Times's front-page exclusives on WMD was, she said, part of "an angry e-mail exchange with a colleague." In the heat of such exchanges, Miller said, "You say things that aren't true. If you look at the record, you'll see they aren't true."
This seems a peculiar admission. Yet on the broader issue of her ties to Chalabi, the record bears Miller out. Before the war, Miller wrote or co-wrote several front-page articles about Iraq's WMD based on information from defectors; only one of them came via Chalabi. An examination of those stories, though, shows that they were open to serious question. The real problem was relying uncritically on defectors of any stripe, whether supplied by Chalabi or not.
This points to a larger problem. In the period before the war, US journalists were far too reliant on sources sympathetic to the administration. Those with dissenting views—and there were more than a few—were shut out. Reflecting this, the coverage was highly deferential to the White House. This was especially apparent on the issue of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction— the heart of the President's case for war. Despite abundant evidence of the administration's brazen misuse of intelligence in this matter, the press repeatedly let officials get away with it. As journalists rush to chronicle the administration's failings on Iraq, they should pay some attention to their own.
...
By late summer of 2002, then, Miller had developed a circle of sources who claimed to have firsthand knowledge of Saddam's continued push for prohibited weapons. And as she and Gordon made the rounds of administration officials, they picked up a dramatic bit of information about Iraq's nuclear program. During the previous fourteen months, they were told, Iraq had tried to import thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes. The tubes had been intercepted, and specialists sent to examine them had concluded from their diameter, thickness, and other technical properties that they had only one possible use—as casings for rotors in centrifuges to enrich uranium, a key step in producing an atomic bomb.
This was dramatic news. If true, it would represent a rare piece of concrete evidence for Saddam's nuclear aspirations. And, on Sunday, September 8, 2002, the Times (then under the editorship of Howell Raines) led with the story, written by Miller and Gordon. "US Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts," the headline said. The lead was emphatic:

More than a decade after Saddam Hussein agreed to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb, Bush administration officials said today.

Gordon and Miller went on to cite the officials' claims about the aluminum tubes and their intended use in centrifuges to enrich uranium.
The article contained several caveats, noting, for instance, that Iraq "is not on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon." Overall, though, the language was stark:

Mr. Hussein's dogged insistence on pursuing his nuclear ambitions, along with what defectors described in interviews as Iraq's push to improve and expand Baghdad's chemical and biological arsenals, have brought Iraq and the United States to the brink of war.

Administration "hard-liners," Gordon and Miller added, worried that "the first sign of a 'smoking gun'... may be a mushroom cloud." The piece concluded with a section on Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, relying heavily on the information supplied by Ahmed al-Shemri. "All of Iraq is one large storage facility," he was quoted as saying.
Gordon and Miller argue that the information about the aluminum tubes was not a leak. "The administration wasn't really ready to make its case publicly at the time," Gordon told me. "Somebody mentioned to me this tubes thing. It took a lot to check it out." Perhaps so, but administration officials were clearly delighted with the story. On that morning's talk shows, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice all referred to the information in the Times story. "It's now public," Cheney said on Meet the Press, that Saddam Hussein "has been seeking to acquire" the "kind of tubes" needed to build a centrifuge to produce highly enriched uranium, "which is what you have to have in order to build a bomb." On CNN's Late Edition, Rice said the tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs." She added: "We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud"—a phrase lifted directly from the Times.
In the days that followed, the story of the tubes received wide publicity. And, on September 12, 2002, President Bush himself, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, said that "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon"— evidence, he added, of its "continued appetite" for such a weapon. In the following months, the tubes would become a key prop in the administration's case for war, and the Times played a critical part in legitimizing it.
...
From the start, however, the Times story raised doubts among many nuclear experts. One was David Albright. A physicist and former weapons inspector who directed the Institute for Science and International Security (the same group for which the defector Khidhir Hamza had worked), Albright favored a tough position on Iraq, believing Saddam to have WMD and advocating strict measures to contain him. In the summer of 2001, however, after the aluminum tubes were intercepted, he had been asked by an official to find out some information about them, and in doing so he had learned of the doubts many experts had about their suitability for use in centrifuges. Some specialists with ties to the US Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency had concluded that the tubes were more likely destined for use in conventional artillery rockets, as Iraq itself had claimed. Officials at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research would later concur.
Reading the September 8 article, Albright felt it was important for the Times to take note of these dissenting views. In the past, he had worked frequently with Judith Miller; in fact, it was Albright who had arranged for her to interview Khidhir Hamza. Although he was unavailable when Miller tried to contact him for the September 8 story, he had several long conversations with her after it was published. He then described the doubts many centrifuge experts had about the administration's claims. And, on September 13, 2002, a follow-up story appeared. It was not, however, what Albright had expected. Six paragraphs into an article that summarized the White House's case against Iraq, Miller and Gordon noted that senior officials acknowledged "that there have been debates among intelligence experts about Iraq's intentions in trying to buy such tubes." But, they quickly noted, those officials insisted that "the dominant view" in the administration was that the tubes were intended for use in centrifuges to enrich uranium. While some experts in the State and Energy Departments "had questioned whether Iraq might not be seeking the tubes for other purposes," the article stated,

other, more senior, officials insisted last night that this was a minority view among intelligence experts and that the CIA had wide support, particularly among the government's top technical experts and nuclear scientists. "This is a footnote, not a split," a senior administration official said.

Yet Albright, having talked with a large number of those experts and scientists, knew that many did not support the CIA assessment. "Understanding the purpose of these tubes was very difficult," he told me.

But hearing there's a debate in the government was knowable by a journalist. That's what I asked Judy to do—to alert people that there's a debate, that there are competent people who disagreed with what the CIA was saying. I thought for sure she'd quote me or some people in the government who didn't agree. It just wasn't there.

The Times, he added,

made a decision to ice out the critics and insult them on top of it. People were bitter about that article—it says that the best scientists are with [the administration].

Miller rejects this. The article, she says, clearly stated that there was a debate about the tubes. As written, however, the piece gives far more attention and credence to officials who dismissed the dissenters, and the debate, as inconsequential—a "footnote."
Frustrated, Albright began preparing his own report about the tubes. Seeking an outlet, he approached Joby Warrick of The Washington Post.
...
The performance of the Times was especially deficient. While occasionally running articles that questioned administration claims, it more often deferred to them. (The Times's editorial page was consistently much more skeptical.) Compared to other major papers, the Times placed more credence in defectors, expressed less confidence in inspectors, and paid less attention to dissenters. The September 8 story on the aluminum tubes was especially significant. Not only did it put the Times's imprimatur on one of the administration's chief claims, but it also established a position at the paper that apparently discouraged further investigation into this and related topics.
The reporters working on the story strongly disagree. That the tubes were intended for centrifuges "was the dominant view of the US intelligence community," Michael Gordon told me. "It looks like it's the wrong view. But the story captured what was and still is the majority view of the intelligence community—whether right or wrong." Not only the director of central intelligence but also the secretary of state decided to support it, Gordon said, adding,

Most of the intelligence agencies in the US government thought that Iraq had something. Both Clinton and Bush officials thought this. So did Richard Butler, who had been head of UNSCOM and who wrote a book about Iraq called "The Greatest Threat." So it was a widely shared assumption in and out of government. I don't recall a whole lot of people challenging that.

Yet there were many people challenging the administration's assertions. It's revealing that Gordon encountered so few of them. On the aluminum tubes, David Albright, as noted above, made a special effort to alert Judith Miller to the dissent surrounding them, to no avail.
Asked about this, Miller said that as an investigative reporter in the intelligence area, "my job isn't to assess the government's information and be an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of The New York Times what the government thought about Iraq's arsenal." Many journalists would disagree with this; instead, they would consider offering an independent evaluation of official claims one of their chief responsibilities.

A rebuttal (mostly from the Times) to Massing and Massing's response is documented here.

Jack Shafer wrote about Judith Miller and the Times in Slate in May 2003:

The lead editorial in Monday's New York Times applauds the news reported in the Times' own pages that the CIA is reassessing the prewar intelligence about Iraqi's unconventional weapons programs collected by the CIA, the National Intelligence Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other agencies. The editorial reads:

The failure so far to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the prime justification for an immediate invasion, or definitive links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda has raised serious questions about the quality of American intelligence and even dark [sic] hints that the data may have been manipulated to support a pre-emptive war. [Emphasis added.]

If the government must re-examine whether data may have been "manipulated" to support the war, surely the New York Times should conduct a similar postwar inventory of its primary WMD reporter, Judith Miller. In the months running up to the war, Miller painted as grave a picture of Iraq's WMD potential as any U.S. intelligence agency, a take that often directly mirrored the Bush administration's view.
...
"[Chalabi] has provided most of the front page exclusives on WMD to our paper," Miller e-mailed Times Baghdad bureau chief John Burns. Miller added that the MET Alpha—a military outfit searching for WMD after the invasion—"is using Chalabi's intell and document network for its own WMD work."
The failure of "Chalabi's intell" to uncover any WMD has embarrassed both the United States and Miller. As noted previously in this column, she oversold the successes of the post-invasion WMD search. On April 21, she reported in the Times that an Iraqi scientist had led MET Alpha to a site where Iraqis had buried chemical precursors for chemical and biological weapons. "Officials" told Miller this was "the most important discovery to date in the hunt for illegal weapons."
On April 22, Miller told The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer the military regarded the scientist as much more than "a smoking gun" in the WMD investigation—he was "a silver bullet." For all of Miller's fist-pumping on behalf of MET Alpha, none of her spectacular findings have been confirmed by other newspapers. (The Washington Post's Barton Gellman did an especially good job of poking holes in Miller's scoop.) The Times has never returned to the MET Alpha "burial grounds" to defend her heavily hyped "silver bullet" account. (See this "Press Box" for a chronology of Miller's reporting from Iraq.)
Did Miller get taken by sources with an agenda, or did she promote their suspect data for her own ideological reasons? Her Iraq coverage has always relied heavily on Iraqi defectors.
To Miller's credit, she often qualifies her defector stories by noting that the CIA doesn't buy what they're selling. In piece after piece, she notes that the agency suspects they invent or embellish their tales to increase chances of winning asylum. But her caveats are usually followed by a passage about how the Pentagon embraces the very defectors the CIA spurns.
...
"The country needs to know if the spy organizations were right or wrong," concludes the Times editorial, a fair and equitable stand. But by the same logic, the country needs to know if Miller and the Times too gullibly advanced the WMD findings of their sources—and if so, why.

Shafer, wrote a follow-up piece in Slate in Feb 2004, asking the Times (again) to come clean - and this time taking Miller to task even more for dissembling repeatedly in trying to defend the indefensible:

Massing levels special scorn at Miller, whose WMD journalism published before the Iraq war, as he footnotes, elicited critical reviews in the Nation, Editor & Publisher Online, AJR, and CJR, and by me in Slate. Responding to Massing's criticism that she channeled the administration's spotty WMD case, Miller blames U.S. intelligence for the discrepancies between what she reported about Iraqi WMD before the war and the latest findings of the weapons hunters. "The fact that the United States so far hasn't found WMD in Iraq is deeply disturbing," she tells Massing. "It raises real questions about how good our intelligence was. To beat up on the messenger is to miss the point."
How's that missing the point? If a messenger persists in delivering inflated and deceptive information—information that benefits her government sources—doesn't she deserve a good public flogging?
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Miller, who is quoted extensively in Massing's piece, faced him again on Feb. 3 on WBUR-FM's The Connection, where she disputed both the conclusions of his New York Review piece and his competence. In one hilarious segment about one-quarter of the way through the show, Miller claims Massing fails to "tell the reader how investigative journalism works," presumably because he doesn't understand it. According to Miller, this is how the investigative process works:

Basically you get a fact, you try and put it in context, you check that alleged fact with as many different sources as you can, and then if that fact turns out to be controversial or—within the government—or not believed by some as you go along you collect more information and you write again. And it's just too easy especially in an area where everything is classified and where people can go to jail for talking to you, it's just too easy to stand back and say why didn't you report this, that, and everything else. … [Click here for Miller Clip 1 from WBUR-FM's The Connection, distributed by NPR.]
The piece that he wrote and his criticisms unfortunately reflects a lack of understanding of about one, how hard information is to get in the national security area and two, how newspapers really go about doing this. Believe me, I tried to vet information in every way that I could before it was published. We never published—not once—an administration allegation without checking it against alleged experts, independent experts, it's just very very hard when this information is this tightly compartmentalized and classified. [Click here for Miller Clip 2.]

Ordinarily, I don't unfurl credentials to defend somebody's reputation, but let me make this exception. As this 2001 biographical note indicates, Massing is the former executive editor of the Columbia Journalism Review and has written for the New York Times Magazine, The New Yorker, the Atlantic Monthly, the Washington Post, the Nation, the New Republic, the American Prospect, and Rolling Stone, among others. He helped found the Committee To Protect Journalists, scored a MacArthur fellowship in 1992, and in 1998 authored The Fix, a widely praised book about drug policy. It's absurd to imagine Massing doesn't understand the mechanics of investigative journalism or doesn't appreciate how difficult national security information can be to obtain.
Indeed, it's Miller who seems clueless about how investigative reporting works. Earlier in the program, she describes her role as the conveyor of official news rather than a skeptical reporter:

My job was not to collect information and analyze it independently as an intelligence agency; my job was to tell readers of the New York Times as best as I could figure out, what people inside the governments who had very high security clearances, who were not supposed to talk to me, were saying to one another about what they thought Iraq had and did not have in the area of weapons of mass destruction. [Click here for Miller Clip 3.]

Where did Miller learn the art of journalism? The job of a good reporter—investigative or otherwise—is more like that of an intelligence analyst than a stenographer. A good reporter is supposed to dig for the truth, no matter what "people inside the governments" with "very high security clearances" might say. The very point of Massing's objections about the prewar WMD coverage is that Knight Ridder folks got closer to the truth with blue collar sources than did Miller with all of her "inside" sources.
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Rather than come clean on The Connection about her stories and simply admit that she was taken, Miller speculates that her stories generate so much "anger" because her critics are all antiwar or they're still furious about the 2000 election, and they've made her the scapegoat. Seriously! She states:

I think the reason … is that people are genuinely angry and upset and deeply polarized about the war. And I think they're genuinely upset and angry about the election of an administration that some people feel, you know an election itself that was, quote, stolen, and that all of this anger has kind of come to the fore in the debate over WMD in Iraq.

Give me a break! I'm one voluble Miller critic who can state unequivocally 1) that the 2000 election wasn't stolen and 2) the Iraq invasion was justified. To pretend that her critics have merely misplaced their anger is psychobabble of the most inane sort.
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Miller's dissembling continued this week when she told Women's Wear Daily on Feb. 10 that Massing's piece "misquoted and misrepresented" her. If Massing really misquoted and misrepresented her, don't you think she should have brought the subject up during The Connection's 45-minute broadcast? Massing responded to Miller's allegation in a letter to Romenesko, writing, "Per our agreement, I checked every quote with her prior to publication. She approved each and every one."

I recommend that readers read Shafer's entire piece to see what a piece of work Miller is. At the same time, the fact that the problem was not just Miller was easily apparent from the reluctance of the Times' top guns to take any real action to address the valid criticisms of Miller's and the Times' work.

For example, the Daily Howler also brought to our attention the more straightforward excuse offered for the Times' stenography by the New York Times' Elisabeth "Is God on America's Side" Bumiller:

Kafka could never have dreamed this crew up! In recent weeks, the New York Times’ Elisabeth Bumiller has published a string of bizarre “White House letters,” praising the president’s fine bedtime habits and rhapsodizing about his warm, “comfy” bed. Snoopy should have gotten a by-line. The scribe also made a fool of herself at a Democratic presidential debate.
Now, the Spotless Mind takes us behind the scenes at that famous pre-Iraq White House press conference. The conference was held on March 6, 2003; assembled reporters lobbed softballs at Bush, bringing themselves widespread ridicule (see THE DAILY HOWLER, 3/11/03). Finally, Bumiller explains the corps’ behavior. Kafka couldn’t have dreamed up a White House correspondent who was willing to say this in public:

BUMILLER: I think we were very deferential because…it’s live, it’s very intense, it’s frightening to stand up there. Think about it, you’re standing up on prime-time live TV asking the president of the United States a question when the country’s about to go to war. There was a very serious, somber tone that evening, and no one wanted to get into an argument with the president at this very serious time.

It’s frightening to stand up there, Bumiller says. It’s frightening to ask the president a question! At the time, Bush hadn’t met with the press in four months; dozens of questions were begging for answers. But according to Bumiller, it was too scary. Why did the “press” lob softballs that day? No one wanted to get in an argument, the spotless Times journalist says.
It’s amazing that Bumiller felt this way. It’s much more amazing that she’d say this in public. You sometimes think we’re being hyperbolic when we say that our “press corps” can’t be from this planet. But remember: The words we quote were recently spoken by the New York Times White House correspondent! We’ve told you for years: You don’t have a press corps! First by her “letters,” then by this statement, Bumiller makes our point clear.

Nick Confessore at TAPPED highlighted how the New York Times' steep drop in journalistic standards is traceable back to its publisher Arthur O. Sulzberger Jr., who defended Judith "WMD" Miller:

NOT OFF THE HOOK YET. Speaking of Judith Miller, Editor & Publisher reports here on remarks New York Times publisher Arthur O. Sulzberger Jr. gave to the National College Media Convention. Among other things, he defended Judith Miller's now widely-discredited reporting on the search for WMDs in Iraq thusly:

At one point, a college reporter asked Sulzberger a pointed question about one of his newspaper's star writers, Judith Miller, who has been widely criticized for misleading coverage of alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq last year. The publisher defended Miller, saying he had known her "for decades," adding that she "has fabulous sources."
Then he added: "Were her sources wrong? Absolutely. Her sources were wrong. And you know something? The administration was wrong. And when you're covering it from the inside like that you're going to get things wrong sometimes. So I don't blame Judy Miller for the lack of finding weapons of mass destruction." This produced a few laughs from audience members. "I blame the administration for believing its own story line," he continued, "to such a point that they weren't prepared to question the authenticity of what they were told."

Not to be glib, but isn't it Miller's job to question the authenticity of what she was being told? To avoid being a conveyor belt for misinformation that even at the time was widely called into question? To not allow herself to be duped by her sources simply because she was close to them?
As Jack Shafer pointed out, the problem was not that Miller was getting at information that nobody else could get, and that information sadly turned out to be wrong. It's that she never challenged the veracity of claims by her high-level, anonymous, ideologically motivated sources by collecting information from the lower-level analysts who turned out to be correct, as did (among others) the fine reporters in Knight-Ridder's Washington bureau.
That her sources got things wrong is no excuse. Sources try to spin reporters all the time -- it's what they do. Miller's responsibility was to avoid getting herself spun, and it's a responsibility she failed to uphold.

With the publisher of the nation's "newspaper of record" (or whatever it is) believing it was/is not the job of his newspaper's staff to try and establish the veracity of the "facts" but merely report what is told to them in stenographic form, it becomes an indisputable fact that the Times' standards for journalistic integrity were probably just barely above that of supermarket tabloids.


3. THE FUTURE: The Times' position today and what it portends for the future 

The New York Times' apology for its skewed pro-war coverage is reproduced below:

Over the last year this newspaper has shone the bright light of hindsight on decisions that led the United States into Iraq. We have examined the failings of American and allied intelligence, especially on the issue of Iraq's weapons and possible Iraqi connections to international terrorists. We have studied the allegations of official gullibility and hype. It is past time we turned the same light on ourselves.
In doing so — reviewing hundreds of articles written during the prelude to war and into the early stages of the occupation — we found an enormous amount of journalism that we are proud of. In most cases, what we reported was an accurate reflection of the state of our knowledge at the time, much of it painstakingly extracted from intelligence agencies that were themselves dependent on sketchy information. And where those articles included incomplete information or pointed in a wrong direction, they were later overtaken by more and stronger information. That is how news coverage normally unfolds.
But we have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been. In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged — or failed to emerge.
The problematic articles varied in authorship and subject matter, but many shared a common feature. They depended at least in part on information from a circle of Iraqi informants, defectors and exiles bent on "regime change" in Iraq, people whose credibility has come under increasing public debate in recent w