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KASHMIR
6/24/03 <link>
Geov
Parrish aptly summarizes not just the hypocrisy on Iraq vs. Pakistan,
but the outrage of Bush's continuing support of Musharraf (via Bushwatch)
Below, we feature major portions of his article.
The
honored guest
Terrorism-sponsoring, nuclear
weapons-equipped dictator visits the White House today
The dictator rose to power by launching a bloody
military coup against a democratically elected government.
Political prisoners, torture, and repression followed.
Three years later,
after changing his title from "General" to
"President" because it sounded better, this dictator
was "elected" in an election boycotted by opposition
groups and most voters, and considered by the rest of the world
to be a complete farce.
His country is now considered one of the world's leading havens
for Muslim fundamentalist terror groups; if Osama bin Laden is
alive, it's thought likely he is here. Our dictator's
intelligence agency trains and arms terror groups sympathetic to
bin Laden, and the country's ongoing support of such groups in a
campaign against its largest neighbor -- a secular democracy --
nearly led to full-blown war last year.
In that confrontation, this dictator threatened to use nuclear
weapons. He has them. North Korea has gotten its nuclear
weapons materials from this country, which is now believed to be
only months away from developing the capacity to launch missiles
with nuclear warheads.
The man is "President" Pervez Musharraf; his country,
Pakistan. And today, Musharraf will probably ask for still more
American weaponry while visiting the White House for an amiable
chat with Pres. George W. Bush.
Publicly, Bush is likely to praise the Pakistani strongman for
his assistance in America's "War on Terror,"
particularly its ongoing war in neighboring Afghanistan.
Privately, Bush is likely to press for more such cooperation,
and for pledges to cut off the North Korean nuclear connection
(which Musharraf denies exists).
But there will be no saber-rattling, no thunderous condemnations
of an evil dictator who poses a menace to democracy. Quite the
contrary; since 9-11, America has become a much closer ally to
Pakistan, dropping the sanctions that were imposed after
Pakistan conducted public tests of its nukes in 1998, so that it
could sell Pakistan its weaponry and use the country in its
Afghan invasion. America's deepening friendship, and Musharraf's
accompanying betrayal of the Taliban (who Pakistan helped bring
to power), have enraged Pakistan's fundamentalists -- who
maintain significant power, particularly within the country's
military and intelligence services.
But cozying up to America and its money has also strengthened
Musharraf's hand. It has enabled him to conduct a blatantly
rigged election in May 2002 with a minimum of outcry -- i.e.,
none -- from Washington. That election came on the heels of a
series of terror attacks in disputed Kashmir province -- and, in
Dec. 2001, on India's parliament building in New Delhi -- that
by June brought the two countries to what Washington and London
intelligence agencies described at the time as a threat of
nuclear war at least as grave as the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Still, somehow, miraculously, Pakistan remains in Washington's
good graces. Musharraf qualifies on virtually every one of the
counts used by George W. Bush and his administration to justify
deposing Saddam Hussein: the nuclear- equipped,
terrorism-sponsoring dictator who represses his own people,
threatens neighboring countries, and exports nuclear technology
to America's enemies. When Bush wags his finger, or poses for
photo-ops on aircraft carriers, so as to posture about such
menaces, Musharraf is the dictator that Muslims around the world
are most likely to point to as an example of America's double
standard. The difference, they say, is that Saddam had oil. And didn't
have nukes.
At home, Musharraf plays a tricky balancing act. He cannot rule
without the support of his military and the ISI -- the
intelligence agency laced with the people who helped launch and
continued to support the Taliban. Kashmir has served as a front
to which he can redirect religious (as well as nationalist)
rage.
Otherwise, despite (and because of) his severe political
repression, the fundamentalists threaten to turn on Musharraf
himself. Musharraf is a dictator; political opposition, whether
in writing or speech, is kept on a short leash, and Pakistan's
notoriously brutal prisons have an ample supply of
anti-Musharraf political prisoners. The famed Islamic training
schools that produced a generation of Islamic radicals have been
targeted at times by Musharraf's forces not just because of
American pressure, but because he wants fundamentalist clerics
to need to rely on his good will. India pushed its dispute with
Pakistan to the boiling point last year in part because with
Pakistan's new missile capacity, India sensed a window of
opportunity closing. Once Pakistan is able to nuke any of
India's cities, India loses significant leverage in its ability
to stop Pakistani-sponsored terror. When last June's nuclear
crisis de-escalated, it was in part because Musharraf himself
ordered Kashmir-based Islamic terror groups to stand down from
their cross-border incursions. There is little doubt his
government continues to sponsor such groups; one of his
protections against America's wrath is its fear that if he
should be deposed, it would be the fundamentalists who would
then control Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and a functional
delivery system, one that can reach Afghanistan and Iraq as
easily as India.
That, Washington argues, would be even worse, so Musharraf must
be supported. But in Saddam's case, Washington did not simply
wring its hands in public and proclaim, with alleged sorrow, a
policy of lesser evilism and what used to be called
"constructive engagement." It spent years isolating
Iraq -- with sanctions far more severe than the ones imposed on
Pakistan in 1998 -- and then, finally, invaded....
The War On Terror wasn't supposed to be more of the same. Born
of 9-11, it was supposed to be about making the protection of
Americans from terror groups a priority so urgent that money was
no object. So why, today, is George Bush playing host to a man
who sponsors terror? Why spend a small fortune and incur
international wrath to go chasing after a dictator whose weapons
and Al-Qaeda links didn't exist, and at the same time cozy up to
a dictator whose nuclear weapons and Al-Qaeda links are common
knowledge?... |
2/8/03 <link>
Pakistan's
support for terrorists and Al Qaeda resumes
Some notes from the Washington Post report (bold is our
emphasis):
"...A
year after President Pervez Musharraf announced a ban on Muslim
extremist groups, a move hailed in Washington as a turning point for
Pakistan, several of the organizations have reconstituted under
different names and are once again raising money and proselytizing for
jihad against India and the West, according to Pakistani officials and
members of the groups. Over the past few
months, leaders of four groups banned by Musharraf have been released
from house arrest or jail. One of them, Hafiz Sayeed of
Lashkar-i-Taiba, has been traveling around the country to meet with
supporters and whip up enthusiasm for renewed attacks on Indian forces
in Kashmir, according to a top aide. Another, Azam Tariq of
Sipah-i-Sahaba, serves in parliament. Pakistani authorities have
released almost all of the hundreds of militants detained after
Musharraf pledged on Jan. 12, 2002, to dismantle extremist groups that
he said were "bringing a bad name to our faith," according
to Pakistani officials and Western diplomats. His landmark speech came
as Pakistani and Indian military forces were massing along their
common border, one month after an attack on India's Parliament complex
by guerrillas that India alleged were supported by Pakistan. Since
Musharraf's address, however, no effort has been made to disarm the
groups, Pakistani officials acknowledge, and donation boxes for the
supposedly outlawed organizations have reappeared in stores, mosques
and other public places. At the same time,
Pakistani officials deny that Musharraf has reneged on his commitment
to curb extremist groups, noting that scores of al Qaeda operatives
have been rounded up in Pakistan in recent months, frequently in
cooperation with the FBI. They say the government had no choice but to
release Pakistani militant leaders and their followers because courts
in many cases found insufficient evidence to continue holding them...
The reemergence of "jihadi groups,"
several of which have been linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda, has
caused deep concern among Western diplomats. They say it holds the
potential for renewed confrontation between Pakistan and India, both
of which possess nuclear arms and nearly went to war last spring, and
calls into question the depth of Musharraf's commitment to the
U.S.-led war on terrorism. In that regard, the
groups' reappearance is further evidence of the shift that has
occurred in the country since hard-line religious parties opposed to
Pakistan's cooperation with the United States staged an unexpectedly
strong showing in national and provincial elections last fall...Last
month, American frustration with Musharraf flared into the open when
the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Nancy Powell, during a speech to
businessmen in Karachi, called on the government to fulfill its
pledges to "end the use of Pakistan as a platform for
terrorism." Although U.S. officials subsequently played down its
significance, the remark caused an uproar in Pakistan, whose
government is unaccustomed to such blunt talk from Washington's envoy...From
all indications, however, the government still maintains a lenient
attitude toward groups focused on the Kashmir conflict, such as
Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Muhammad. Trained and supplied by
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, these
organizations have long been regarded as an instrument of state
policy...Indian officials regularly argue to their U.S. counterparts
that Pakistan is on the wrong side of that war...Equally alarming to
the West and to moderate Pakistanis, some Lashkar-i-Taiba fighters
trained in Afghanistan during the Taliban era, and their leader,
Sayeed, have professed admiration for Osama bin Laden....The
government has also allowed considerable latitude for militant leaders
who were supposed to have been reined in. Even during their
detention, for example, Sayeed and two other militant leaders --
Masood Azhar of Jaish-i-Muhammad and Fazlul Rahman Khalil of Harkat
ul-Mujaheddin -- stayed in ISI safe houses, where they were permitted
visitors and the use of cell phones, according to statements filed by
their relatives in court proceedings related to their cases...In
the two months since he was released, Sayeed, the Lashkar-i-Taiba
founder, has addressed about 100 gatherings around the country to
"educate people about the virtues of jihad," according to an
aide who spoke on condition of anonymity..."
11/14/02 <link>
India
has some criticism of the U.S. and U.K. for not doing enough against
Pakistan
Washington Times report highlights struggle by Indians to make the
West acknowledge Pakistan's long support for terrorism. It is indeed
disturbing that with so much evidence being public now about Pakistan
being essentially a terrorist state, that the status quo continues. On
the one hand, there are arguments that unseating Musharraf by
attacking Pakistan would likely make the Government unstable to
takeover by terrorist-friendly fundamentalists within Pakistan. This
situation may get more adverse if such fundamentalists took over
Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure. At the same time, is it really that
hard to find a measured way to invade Pakistan (as a response to 9/11
and for their continuing to be a safe haven for Al Qaeda - see Time,
New
York Times) and immediately take over their nuclear
infrastructure?
10/20/02 <link>
A Primer on Kashmir
We were referred to the website
of Akhila Raman, who maintains a website devoted to the Kashmir
issue and attempts to provide an objective review of the relevant
history and truth relating to Kashmir. Some of the information on her
website that we found interesting, included, (a) a fairly
detailed chronology of the history of the conflicts in Kashmir,
and (b) a brief
analysis of the recent poll in Kashmir and the preferences of the
population in different portions of Kashmir, in terms of whether they
are pro-Pakistan, pro-India or pro-independence.
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